6. Toward Empire

6.
Toward Empire

Julius Caesar, The Gallic War (52 B.C.E.)

The violent failure of the Gracchan reforms marked the end of political cooperation among the Roman elite and, in the process, opened the door for a new kind of leader in the republic—the general-politician—who used his own troops to gain wealth and power. After securing a special command in Gaul, Julius Caesar (100–44 B.C.E.) exhibited just such a strategy through a combination of military genius and political savvy. Between 58 and 50 B.C.E., he and his army pushed past Rome’s northwest frontier, conquering much of modern-day France along the way. His success sparked a general rebellion among the peoples of central Gaul in 52 B.C.E., led by the tribal chief Vercingetorix (d. 46 B.C.E.). Caesar described the revolt and its climax at the fortress of Alesia in The Gallic War, excerpted below. In his account, he provides a glimpse of the realities of warfare and, at the same time, of how he won loyalty both at home and abroad. He used this loyalty as leverage in the civil war brewing in Rome, which ultimately destroyed the republic.

From Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 181, 183–84, 188–89, 191–94, 241–42.

. . . Now all his cavalry had fled, Vercingetorix withdrew his infantry force, which he had stationed in front of the three camps, and immediately began the march to Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii. He issued orders for the baggage to be fetched quickly from the camps and to follow on behind. Caesar had his army’s baggage taken to the nearest high ground and left two legions behind to guard it. He pursued Vercingetorix as long as the light lasted and killed about 3,000 of the enemy rearguard. The following day he pitched camp near Alesia. He reconnoitered the city’s position and provoked panic in the enemy; then, after encouraging the soldiers for the task they faced, he set about the work of circumvallation.1

The actual stronghold of Alesia2 was in an extremely lofty position on top of a hill, apparently impregnable except by means of a siege. On two sides the foot of this hill was washed by rivers, and for about three miles there stretched a plain in front of the town. Close by in every other direction more hills of equal height girded the town. Beneath the wall, where the hill faced east, the Gallic forces filled the entire space: they had constructed a ditch and a six-foot wall. The length of the siege-works which the Romans had started reached ten miles. Camps had been pitched at suitable locations and twenty-three forts built along the line. These forts were garrisoned in the daytime, to guard against unexpected sorties; at night sentries and reinforced patrols kept watch there. . . .

Vercingetorix now decided to send all his cavalry away by night before the Romans completed their siege-works. As they left, he told each of them to go to his own people and muster for battle all the men of an age to bear arms. He described the services he had done them and called upon them to take thought for his safety, and not to abandon him to the enemy’s torments after he had done so much to secure the liberty of all. . . .

All these arrangements were relayed to Caesar by deserters and prisoners. He then decided to set up the following types of fortification. He had a twenty-foot-wide ditch dug, with vertical sides, so that the bottom of the ditch was as wide as its edges at the top. He fixed the position of all the other fortifications 400 paces back from the ditch, with the intention of preventing an unexpected or night-time onslaught on them by the enemy army, and of stopping the enemy aiming missiles at our men while they were busy on the siege-works; for the area he had enclosed was necessarily of considerable size, and it would be difficult to encircle the entire site with a cordon of soldiers. At this distance away, then, he extended two more ditches, of the same depth but fifteen feet across; he filled the inner one (which was on low-lying ground in the plain) with water diverted from the river. Behind them he constructed an earthwork with a rampart on top, twelve feet high; to this he attached a parapet and battlements, with large pointed stakes projecting at the joints where the parapet attached to the earthwork. This would slow down an enemy ascent. He placed towers all round the siege-works at intervals of eighty feet. . . .

Meanwhile Commius3 and the other leaders entrusted with the supreme command reached Alesia with all their forces. They occupied a hill outside, less than a mile from our fortifications, and took up position there. The next day they brought their cavalry out of camp and filled the whole of the plain which we described earlier as being three miles across. They withdrew their infantry force a short distance and halted it on high ground. From the town of Alesia there was a clear view on to the plain. . . .

Vercingetorix saw his men from the citadel of Alesia and marched out of the town, taking the wicker hurdles, poles, shelters, siege-hooks, and the rest of the equipment he had had made ready for the sortie. At one and the same moment there was fighting on every side, and every expedient was put to the test. Wherever a hint of weakness appeared, there they flocked to the attack. The Roman force was strung out along its extensive fortifications and found rallying to the defense difficult in many places. The shouting which arose behind them was effective in frightening our men as they fought, for they realized that the risk to themselves depended on the courage shown by others: after all, it is usually the case that what is unseen is more effective in disturbing men’s minds.

Caesar took over a suitable spot and found out what was happening in every quarter; he sent help to those who were in difficulties. Both sides realized that this was the very moment for putting their utmost effort into the fight—the Gauls must despair of saving themselves unless they broke through the Roman defenses, and the Romans, if they held firm, were looking forward to the end of all their labors. . . . The unfavorable downward slope of the site played a crucial part. Some of the enemy threw missiles, others formed a “tortoise” and moved up close; exhausted troops were continually being replaced by fresh. They all threw earth on to the defenses, which gave the Gauls a means of ascent as well as covering over the devices which the Romans had hidden in the ground. Our men were now running out of weapons and of strength.

When he realized what was happening Caesar sent Labienus with six cohorts to help the men in trouble. He told him that if it was impossible to hold his ground he should withdraw his forces and then launch a counter-attack—but this was only to be done in an emergency. Caesar then approached the rest of the men in person, and urged them not to give up the struggle. He explained how the fruits of all their previous battles depended on that day, that hour. Inside the Roman lines the enemy abandoned hope of success on the level ground because of the size of the defenses; so they tried to climb one of the steep ascents to take it, and had all the equipment they had prepared conveyed there. A hail of missiles from the defenders on the towers scattered them, but they filled in the ditches with earth and hurdles, and started to tear down the rampart and parapet with grappling-hooks.

Caesar sent first the young Brutus4 with some cohorts, then his legate Gaius Fabius with more. Finally, when the fighting grew more fierce, he came in person, leading fresh troops for reinforcements. The battle was renewed and the enemy forced back. Then Caesar made for the place where he had sent Labienus. He withdrew four cohorts from the nearest fort and ordered one section of the cavalry to follow him, the rest to move round the outer defenses and attack the enemy from the rear. Once Labienus had found that neither earthworks nor ditches could stand up to the enemy attack, he gathered eleven cohorts, which happened to be available after their withdrawal from the nearby guardposts. He then sent word to Caesar of what he thought needed to be done.

Caesar hurried to join in the fighting. The conspicuous color of the cloak5 he habitually wore in battle proclaimed his arrival. Because the downward slopes were in clear view from the heights above, the enemy spotted the cavalry squadrons and cohorts he had ordered to follow him and joined battle. A shout went up from both sides, and was answered by another from the rampart and defense-works. Our men threw their spears, then fought with swords. Suddenly the cavalry was glimpsed in the rear: more cohorts were advancing. The enemy turned tail and the cavalry charged them as they fled. Massive slaughter followed. . . . Those in the town viewed the slaughter and the flight of their comrades: abandoning hope, they withdrew their forces from the defenses.

As soon as the news broke, the Gauls fled from their camp. If our men had not been exhausted after numerous relief efforts and all the struggles of the day they would have been able to wipe out the entire enemy army. The cavalry was sent out at around midnight and caught up with the enemy rearguard. Many of the enemy were taken and killed, and the rest fled to their home states.

The following day Vercingetorix called a council and argued that he had undertaken this war not in his own interests but for the liberty of all. Since they were forced to yield to fortune, he went on, he was putting himself in their hands, ready for either outcome, whether they wanted to make reparation to the Romans by putting him to death, or to hand him over alive.

They sent envoys to Caesar to discuss these options, and he ordered them to give up their weapons and bring out the ringleaders. Then he took his seat within the fortifications in front of his camp, and the ringleaders were brought to him there. Vercingetorix was handed over, and weapons were thrown down. Caesar had the Aedui and Arverni kept back, in case he could use them to win back their states’ allegiance, and the rest of the prisoners he shared out as booty, one apiece, to his entire army.

Once this business was settled he set out for the territory of the Aedui and won back their nation. The Arvernian envoys who had been sent there pledged to carry out whatever he told them to do.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

  1. What does Caesar’s description of the siege of Alesia reveal about the technology of war at the time? How did Caesar use this technology to his advantage?

    Question

    p6gxFLtL2EgkqHAXoVHgkICMTVL+TWUfQ6/qXPmDnbuWGW+JJvfl4hG6vW1lO5FvkjLGUGYtm4lzH7hpx5+kwJEBMwrwDmSPPSr7Kyic7eXRmGjnWB3fjq1wwriis3ahHcFnnKgL/wHlDwd41l/HIJwcV4mlisZn7nf4JtKIbbHb1l3ipF4+SITl9DQZAFyq2SWDltjx1X20HICgQT2kW86pPTpuwfT7xklbtd1lRq/e9hdQvcacAxpN+3Lf+bvPHG7rktR+B0M=
    What does Caesar’s description of the siege of Alesia reveal about the technology of war at the time? How did Caesar use this technology to his advantage?
  2. What does Caesar’s portrait of Vercingetorix suggest about Roman attitudes toward non-Romans?

    Question

    MWUZLonrB0FL1vVeHZylM9wOdpBz8z/bPLLzdMoatU6fVb6nVGOxHNpijZeJ+W0TtpqxvkCXRkqlGYrwiK7qfTGi5moG0Tk8i2P7aLMkZhW7P7Us30qJOq99YOe8VujEiT9ocD/gzs8E5XrPY2hqlCCCkZAo7acFU2M6BOXWHjJigy/6yOx5E/Aiw4s=
    What does Caesar’s portrait of Vercingetorix suggest about Roman attitudes toward non-Romans?
  3. Although Caesar wrote The Gallic War to describe his own deeds, he uses “he” (the third person) instead of “I” (the first person) in telling his story. Why do you think he made this choice? Does his use of the third person give you more confidence, or less, in the truth of his account?

    Question

    hp0z39sbmJs6nvHEn3rgNNfJguqFU1KCgZYNAk2PUDZAKUtbGMw66yuvamEQc5+4Lg3HvWieoJ8gM1WdrAOMkrUSaOmY+s1yrolI3W9tZx9WZcUttuTM76kkrGyT9UHI31UCFD/TJC74nEZg15Jy3sHd1u7RA5uzgdZRCEppHvMCfCdUXbfAM7fHb9K+y08Rnx50eHlKn+bVpLnHsBtkoHpzGr18BnHJl0YyfButHD6L78fXJ5jsVZY114kebNRM61fdvdKTL7w7tJQICmhMCB8vQpyghssoDRrPeKZDA5RfOSNqMpr8nhbNsH+KTf2Hg73HDpc7JOW0PXi9TuBYJ3sZrgsD58d1CNQdzBw9uG66rE1ReZj8CLKobN0LwVRaN6tu1Y6VDIEL78811tZggAHxxyWbw3Ax+wSSmgY/2Tu9FotCIRy+9AOad9TZP2/G+OWKI04/ednD0qWJ
    Although Caesar wrote The Gallic War to describe his own deeds, he uses “he” (the third person) instead of “I” (the first person) in telling his story. Why do you think he made this choice? Does his use of the third person give you more confidence, or less, in the truth of his account?
  4. In writing this account, how do you think Caesar intended to shape his public image and why?

    Question

    K3Uumf2RordZD2dOaz7QZ307OVJHqRJlVM6R03BVPitdR11qBLAqDe8SdREsNH57/QQo/1QI3okJyVXjDPjyia5JvCqBvAfw0KvQZ3eJl416WN2XSWyzN0hssHoceM3GWl9LF+Qc/DOyF/gMF1eFDSvu66aivRcX5CDuqgdRfwD9UPArUjGHYA==
    In writing this account, how do you think Caesar intended to shape his public image and why?