Considering his country a victim of the outcome of the missile crisis, Fidel Castro decades later organized conferences in Cuba that brought together participants in the 1962 crisis from all three governments. Many revelations came out of these meetings, mostly displaying the depth of misunderstanding on each side. Soviets and Cubans, for instance, were convinced that Kennedy would attack Cuba again after the Bay of Pigs while next to no one in Washington voiced that intention. Perhaps most illuminating were Castro’s long speeches during the conference, of which the following is an excerpt.
[W]hen the issue of the missiles was first brought up, we thought that it was something beneficial to the consolidation of the defensive power of the entire socialist bloc, that it would contribute to this. We did not want to concentrate on our problems.
Subsequently, it represented our defense. Subsequently. But really, the comrades who participated were the comrades of the directorate, who met to analyze this problem and make a decision. And how was it presented: That in our opinion it would strengthen the socialist bloc, the socialist bloc.
. . . If it was a matter of our defense alone, we would not have accepted the missiles here. But, do not think that it was because of the dangers that could come from having the missiles here, but rather because of the way in which this could damage the image of the revolution. We were very committed to the image of the revolution in the rest of Latin America.
The fact that the presence of the missiles would turn us into a Soviet military base would have a high political cost for our country’s image, which we valued so highly.
. . . Of course, we never saw the missiles as something that could one day be used against the United States, in an attack against the United States, an unjustified attack or a first strike. I remember that Nikita was always repeating: that they would never make a first strike, a nuclear strike. This issue was an obsession of his. He was constantly talking about peace. He was constantly talking about negotiations with the United States, of ending the Cold War, the arms race, etc.
. . . A truly strange phenomenon occurred among the Soviet troops in a situation such as that one, in which the people were in extreme danger and at the same time remained totally calm. The Soviet and Cuban troops remained totally calm. There was total calm among the Cuban people. If you conducted a poll of the Cuban people and asked: Should we return the missiles? Ninety percent would have answered no. Our people maintained a calm and intransigent position regarding this issue. That same day, the 26th, we notified the Soviet officers that low-altitude overflights were unacceptable, as I mentioned before and, therefore, our batteries were going to open fire, and we wanted them to be informed.
. . . We found out about the agreement on the 28th. I believe that there was a message on the way, informing us after the fact. It arrived one or two hours later through the embassy. The reaction of all the people, of all the people, all the cadres, of all the comrades was of profound indignation, it was not a feeling of relief. Then, the political decision that we immediately took was to issue the five-point demands.
. . . It would have been enough if Nikita had said: Would you agree to the withdrawal of the missiles if satisfactory guaranties are given to Cuba? Cuba was not a stumbling block to that solution. Cuba would have helped but would have said the minimum guarantees we want are these.
Source: “Foreign Broadcast Information Service,” in The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, edited by Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, 346–53 (New York: New Press, 1998).
Evaluating the Evidence