Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev began the missile crisis as close allies but ended it on bitter terms. Not only did Khrushchev negotiate an end to the crisis without Castro’s counsel, but he removed all his missiles in addition to IL-28 bombers that Castro considered crucial to Cuba’s defense. All Khrushchev extracted from Kennedy in return was a mere promise not to invade the island, which Kennedy had no intention of doing anyway. In addition, because he had accepted Soviet missiles, Castro was made an outcast at the Organization of American States and lost much of his influence on moderates and reformers in Latin America.
The following letters were written on October 28, one day after a Soviet commander on the ground gave the order to shoot down a U.S. spy plane, killing its pilot. The incident was arguably the most dangerous of the crisis and came on a day of several similar incidents, including the accidental flight of a U.S. military jet over Soviet airspace.
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro:
Our message to President Kennedy of October 27, allows for a solution of the problem in your favor, defending Cuba from an invasion, from an outbreak of such a war. Kennedy’s answer, which you obviously know, offers U.S. guarantees that they will not only not invade Cuba with their own forces, but that they will not allow their allies to do so. The President of the United States has thus responded favorably to my messages of October 26 and 27.
We have just drafted our response to the President’s message. I will not write it here since it is being transmitted by radio.
Because of this we would now like to advise you, in this turning point of the crisis, not to get carried away by your feelings: show firmness. It must be said that we understand your profound indignation at the aggressive actions of the U.S.A and at its violation of the fundamental norms of international law.
For the time being, however, it is not law that rules but rather the lack of sense of the militarists in the Pentagon. Since an agreement is in sight, the Pentagon is looking for a pretext to thwart it. This is why it organizes provocative overflights. Yesterday, you shot down one of them, yet previously you did not when they flew over your territory. That step will be used by aggressors to their advantage, to further their aims.
Because of this we would like to advise you, in the spirit of friendship, to show patience, firmness and more firmness. Naturally, if there is an invasion, it will be necessary to fight it with everything. But one must not allow oneself to fall for provocations. Now that a solution is being found — one that is in your favor and that guarantees against an invasion — the unbridled militarists in the Pentagon want to frustrate the agreement and provoke you into taking actions that could be used against you. We ask you not to give them a pretext for this.
We on our part will do everything to stabilize the situation in Cuba, to defend Cuba from invasion and to assure you the possibilities for the peaceful construction of the socialist society.
We send you, and your entire collective direction, our greetings.
N. Khrushchev
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Havana
October 28, 1962
Mr. Nikita Khrushchev
Prime Minister of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSR
Dear Comrade Khrushchev:
I have just received your letter.
The position of our government concerning your communication to us is embodied in the statement formulated today, whose text you surely know.
I wish to clear up something concerning the antiaircraft measures we adopted. You say: “Yesterday you shot down one of these [planes], while earlier you didn’t shoot them down when they overflew your territory.”
Earlier isolated violations were committed without a determined military purpose or without a real danger stemming from those flights.
This time that wasn’t the case. There was the danger of a surprise attack on certain military installations. We decided not to sit back and wait for a surprise attack, with our detection radar turned off, when the potentially aggressive planes flying with impunity over the targets could destroy them totally. We didn’t think we should allow that after all the efforts and expenses incurred in and, in addition, because it would weaken us greatly, militarily and morally. For that reason, on October 24 the Cuban forces mobilized 50 antiaircraft batteries, our entire reserve then, to provide support to the Soviet forces’ positions. If we sought to avoid the risks of a surprise attack, it was necessary for Cuban artillerymen to have orders to shoot. The Soviet command can furnish you with additional reports of what happened to the plane that was shot down.
Earlier, airspace violations were carried out de facto and furtively. Yesterday the American government tried to make official the privilege of violating our airspace at any hour of the day and night. We cannot accept that, as it would be tantamount to giving up a sovereign prerogative. However, we agree that we must avoid an incident at this precise moment that could seriously harm the negotiations, so we will instruct the Cuban batteries not to open fire, but only for as long as the negotiations last and without revoking the declaration published yesterday about the decision to defend our airspace. It should also be taken into account that under the current tense conditions incidents can take place accidentally.
I also wish to inform you that we are in principle opposed to an inspection of our territory.
I appreciate extraordinarily the efforts you have made to keep the peace and we are absolutely in agreement with the need for struggling for that goal. If this is accomplished in a just, solid and definitive manner, it will be an inestimable service to humanity.
Fraternally,
Fidel Castro
Source: Khrushchev letter: The American Experience: JFK, “Special Features: Primary Resources,” PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/jfk/; Castro letter: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary, National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington D.C.
Evaluating the Evidence