The Median Voter Theorem Each voter has an ideal policy, marked by an x, on the less-to-more spending line. Voters will vote for the candidate whose policy is closest to their ideal. The median voter is the voter such that half of the other voters want more spending and half of the other voters want less spending—Inez is the median voter. Under majority rule, the ideal policy of the median voter will beat any other policy. Consider any two candidate policies, such as those of Candidate D and Candidate R. Candidate D will receive two votes (Max and Sofia) and Candidate R will receive three votes (Inez, Peter, and Alex). But Candidate R’s position can be beaten by a policy even closer to the ideal policy of the median voter, such as that of Candidate D?. Over time, competition pushes both candidates toward the ideal policy of the median voter, which is the only policy that cannot be beaten.