To illustrate the adjusted winner procedure, we will consider an application to the multibillion-dollar world of business mergers. It turns out that one of the most elusive ingredients in the success of a merger is what deal-makers call social issues—how power, position, sacrifice, and status are allocated between the merging companies and their executives.
As a case in point, let’s revisit the 1998 proposed merger between two giant pharmaceutical companies, Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham. While most of the details underlying this aborted deal are still unknown to outsiders, the role of social issues is clearly underscored by reports that the companies saw nearly $19 billion of stock market value vanish in the clash of two corporate egos.
Exactly what kinds of issues might bring on a “clash of two corporate egos”? While not privy to the details of the Glaxo Wellcome-SmithKline Beecham merger attempt, we can speculate as to their nature. For purposes of illustration, let’s assume that the following five social issues were paramount:
Each of these five social issues is known to have been a major factor in other recent proposed mergers. For example, when Chrysler merged with Daimler-Benz in 1998, the issue of the choice of a name for the combined company was described as a “standoff” before both sides finally agreed to DaimlerChrysler.
So let’s assume that these were the five social issues confronting Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham, and let’s see how the adjusted winner procedure would have suggested a resolution. The starting point—and something that is quite difficult when dealing with issues (as in a negotiation) as opposed to objects (as in a divorce)—is to have each side quantify the importance it attaches to getting its own way on each of the issues.
With the adjusted winner procedure, quantification is done by having each side—independently and simultaneously—spread 100 points over the issues in a way that reflects the relative worth of each issue to that party. In our present example, let’s assume that the companies allocated their 100 points as shown in Table 13.1. The adjusted winner procedure is now used to decide which side gets its way on which issues, but the procedure requires that a compromise of sorts may have to be reached on one of the issues.
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Point Allocations | ||
---|---|---|
Issue | Glaxo Wellcome | SmithKline Beecham |
Name | 5 | 10 |
Headquarters | 25 | 10 |
Chair | 35 | 20 |
CEO | 15 | 35 |
Layoffs | 20 | 25 |
Total | 100 | 100 |
Here’s how the procedure works. Suppose that we have two parties and a list of either issues to be resolved in one party’s favor or the other’s (as in our merger example) or objects to be awarded either to one party or to the other (as in a divorce or a two-person inheritance). To have a single word covering both issues and objects, we will often speak of “items.” The adjusted winner procedure follows these basic steps:
Basic Steps in the Adjusted Winner Procedure PROCEDURE
Let’s demonstrate the adjusted winner procedure by continuing with our analysis of the proposed merger between Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham. Why the order of transfer given in Step 3 is so important will be explained later.
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Step 2. We now calculate the point ratio of the three issues held by the initial winner, SmithKline Beecham:
Step 4. Let be the fractional part of the layoff issue that will be transferred from SmithKline Beecham to Glaxo Wellcome. Because SmithKline Beecham had 25 points on the layoff issue, it loses points; because Glaxo Wellcome had 20 points on the layoff issue, it gains points.
Hence, the original point totals of 70 for SmithKline Beecham and 60 for Glaxo Wellcome become, after the transfer, and , respectively. Thus, if we want a fraction that will make SmithKline Beecham’s total points equal Glaxo Wellcome’s total points, then we need to solve the following equation:
Algebra Review Appendix
Linear Equations in One Variable
Step 5. We use algebra to solve this equation.
Reducing the fraction, we see that . Inserting 2/9 back into the equation, we see that
or approximately 64 points for each side. Thus, equality of points is achieved when SmithKline Beecham gives up two-ninths of what it wanted on the issue of layoffs and Glaxo Wellcome gets two-ninths of its way.
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Suppose SmithKline Beecham had placed 25 points on CEO and 35 points on Layoffs, with all other point assignments as in Table 13.1. SmithKline Beecham is still the initial winner and still holds the same three items: Layoffs, Name, and CEO. What are the new point ratios? What is the new order in which issues are transferred?
Having seen how the adjusted winner procedure works, we must now ask the following question: Exactly what is it about the allocation produced by this scheme that would make someone want to use it? To answer this question, we need three definitions.
Equitable DEFINITION
A fair-division procedure is said to be equitable if each player believes he or she received the same fractional part of the total value.
Envy-free DEFINITION
A fair-division procedure is said to be envy-free if each player has a strategy that can guarantee him or her a share of whatever is being divided that is, in the eyes of that player, at least as large (or at least as desirable) as that received by any other player, no matter what the other players do.
Pareto-Optimal DEFINITION
A fair-division procedure is said to be Pareto-optimal if it produces an allocation of the property such that no other allocation achieved by any means whatsoever can make any one player better off without making some other player worse off.
The answer to our earlier question is given by the following theorem (whose proof can be found in Fair Division by Brams and Taylor, listed in the Suggested Readings on page 570):
Properties of the Adjusted Winner Allocation THEOREM
For two parties, the adjusted winner procedure produces an allocation based on each player’s assignment of 100 points over the items to be divided that has the following properties:
Economists consider Pareto optimality (named after Vilfredo Pareto) to be an extremely important property, and the order of transfer in Step 3 on page 541 of the adjusted winner procedure is so important because it guarantees that the outcome is Pareto-optimal. The fact that the adjusted winner procedure produces an allocation that is efficient in this sense leads us to hope that it can and will play a future role in real-world dispute resolution.
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