Suppose the two candidates are A and B and that A has won the election using majority rule, with n votes to B’s m votes where n>m. First, if any two voters exchange ballots, then A still receives n votes (although from a slightly different collection of voters) and B still receives m votes (again from a slightly different collection of voters). Thus, A is still the winner. Second, if every voter were to change his or her ballot, then B would receive the n votes that A previously received and vice versa. Hence, B would be the new winner with n votes. Third, if some voter who had voted for B changed his or her vote to one for A, then A’s total would become n+1 and B’s total would become m-1. Hence, A would still win.
Beth gets the next offer using Condorcet’s method because she defeats Adam and Dan one on one by identical scores of 3 to 2.
No. According to the definition, a voting system is manipulable only if there is an election in which a voter gets a more preferred outcome (rather than a less preferred outcome) by submitting a disingenuous ballot.
Arizona would have lost 24 points (for losing a second-place vote) and 22 points (for losing a fourth- place vote), for a total loss of 46 points. Hence, if Arizona received 17 third-place votes instead of 15, it would gain back the 46 lost points and still have a total of 1517.
No, Candidate D is not a Condorcet winner, because D loses to B in a one-on-one contest.
No, Candidate A is not a Condorcet winner, because A loses to C (and, incidentally, to D as well) in a one-on- one contest.