The Cold War produced the second Red scare. Just two weeks after his speech announcing the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, the president signed an executive order creating the Federal Employee Loyalty Program. Under this program, a board investigated federal employees to see if “reasonable grounds [existed] to suspect disloyalty.” The attorney general compiled a list of suspect organizations to assist the board. Soviet espionage was, in fact, a cause for legitimate concern. Spies operated in both Canada and the United States during and after World II, and they had infiltrated the Manhattan Project. The Venona papers, declassified intercepts of Soviet intelligence communications first released in 1995, suggest that a cadre of government officials and federal employees worked for Soviet intelligence during the 1930s and 1940s.

The loyalty board, however, did not focus on espionage. Rather, it concentrated its attention on individuals who espoused dissenting views on a variety of political, social, and economic issues. It failed to uncover a single verifiable case of espionage or find even one actual Communist in public service. This lack of evidence did not stop the board from dismissing 378 government employees for their political beliefs and personal behavior. People lost jobs because they did not satisfactorily answer such questions as “Do you believe in racial integration?” or “Do you listen to the records of Paul Robeson?” (Robeson was an African American singer and actor who had close ties to Communists and the Soviet Union.) Some employees were dismissed because they were homosexuals and considered susceptible to blackmail by foreign agents. (Heterosexual men and women who were having extramarital affairs were not treated in the same manner.) The accused rarely faced their accusers and at times did not learn the nature of the charges against them. This disregard for due process of law spread as loyalty boards at state and municipal levels questioned and fired government employees, including public school teachers and state university professors.

Congress also investigated communism in the private sector, especially in industries that shaped public opinion. In 1947 HUAC broadened the anti-Red probe from Washington to Hollywood. Convinced that the film industry had come under Communist influence and threatened to poison the minds of millions of moviegoers, HUAC conducted hearings that attracted much publicity. HUAC cited for contempt ten witnesses, among them directors and screenwriters, for refusing to answer questions about their political beliefs and associations. These and subsequent hearings assumed the form of a ritual. The committee already had information from the FBI about the witnesses; HUAC really wanted the accused to confess their Communist heresy publicly and to show contrition by naming their associates. Those who did not comply were considered “unfriendly” witnesses and were put on an industry blacklist that deprived them of employment. See Document Project 24: McCarthyism and the Hollywood Ten.

HUAC grabbed even bigger headlines in 1948. With Republicans in charge of the committee, they launched a probe of Alger Hiss, a former State Department official in the Roosevelt administration who had accompanied the president to the Yalta Conference. The hearings resulted from charges brought by former Soviet spy Whittaker Chambers that Hiss had passed him classified documents. Hiss denied the allegations, and President Truman dismissed them as a distraction. In fact, Democrats viewed the charges as a politically motivated attempt by Republicans to characterize the Roosevelt and Truman administrations as having been riddled with Communists.

The Democrats’ concerns proved well founded. Following Truman’s victory in the 1948 presidential election, first-term Republican congressman Richard M. Nixon kept the Hiss affair alive. A member of HUAC, Nixon went to Chambers’s farm and discovered a cache of documents that Chambers had stored for safekeeping in a hollowed-out pumpkin. Armed with these “Pumpkin Papers,” Nixon reopened the case. Hiss never wavered in maintaining his innocence, and the statute of limitations for espionage from the 1930s had expired. Nonetheless, the federal government had enough evidence to prosecute him for perjury. One trial produced a hung jury, but a second convicted Hiss; he was sentenced to five years in prison.

Hiss’s downfall tarnished the Democrats, as Republicans charged them with being “soft on communism.” It did not matter that Truman was a cold warrior who had advanced the doctrine of containment to stop Soviet expansionism or that he had instituted the federal loyalty program to purge Communists from government. In fact, in 1949 Truman tried to demonstrate his cold warrior credentials by authorizing the Justice Department to prosecute twelve high-ranking officials of the Communist Party for violating the Smith Act. In 1951 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the Communist leaders on the grounds that they posed a “clear and present danger” to the United States by advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Despite the presence of some 43,000 Communists, nearly all of them known to the FBI, out of a total population of 150 million and with no evidence of immediate danger, in Dennisv. United States the justices decided that “the gravity of the [Communist] evil” was enough to warrant conviction under the Smith Act.

In 1950 the Truman administration also prosecuted Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Unlike the Dennis case, which involved political beliefs, the Rosenbergs were charged with espionage. When the Russians successfully tested an atomic bomb in 1949, anyone accused of helping them obtain this weapon became “Public Enemy Number One.” The outbreak of the Korean War the following year, in which tens of thousands of soldiers died, made the Rosenbergs appear as conspirators to murder. After a lengthy trial in 1951, the couple received the death penalty, rather than a possible thirty-year sentence, undoubtedly because they refused to confess and because the trial took place during the war. The presiding judge, Irving Kaufman, admitted as much. In sentencing them to death, he told the Rosenbergs that their actions “caused . . . the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows what millions more innocent people may pay the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal, you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country.”

By 1950 the anti-Communist crusade included Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives. Liberals had the most to lose because conservatives could easily brand them as ideologically tainted. In his successful campaign to become a U.S. senator from California in 1950, Richard Nixon had accused his opponent, the liberal Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, of being “pink down to her underwear,” not quite a Red but close enough. Liberal civil rights and civil liberties groups as well as labor unions were particularly vulnerable to such charges and rushed to rid their organizations of suspected Communists. Such efforts did nothing, however, to slow down conservative attacks. The conservative Republican chairman of HUAC, Harold Velde, linked the anti-Communist issue to traditional Republican fiscal policy in the slogan “Get the Reds out of Washington and Washington out of the red.” In 1950 Republicans supported legislation proposed by Senator Pat McCarran, a conservative Democrat from Nevada, which required Communist organizations to register with the federal government, established detention camps to incarcerate radicals during national emergencies, and denied passports to American citizens suspected of Communist affiliations. (As a result, singer Paul Robeson lost his right to travel abroad.) The severity of the entire measure proved too much for President Truman, and he vetoed it. Reflecting the bipartisan consensus on the issue, the Democratic-controlled Congress overrode the veto.