Document 24.3 Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Objections to the Marshall Plan, 1947

Vyacheslav Molotov | Soviet Objections to the Marshall Plan, 1947

Shortly after Secretary of State George Marshall proposed the Marshall Plan to grant economic assistance to Europe, France and the United Kingdom invited Soviet leaders to a conference in Paris to discuss their response to General Marshall’s offer. In the following selection, Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov lays out an alternative vision of economic assistance, which implicitly rejects the Marshall Plan.

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When efforts are directed toward Europe helping herself in the first place and developing her economic potentialities as well as the exchange of goods between countries, such efforts are in conformity with the interests of the countries of Europe. When, however, it is stated . . . that the decisive hold on the rehabilitation of the economic life of European countries should belong to the United States and not to the European countries themselves, such a position stands in contradiction to the interests of European countries since it might lead to a denial of their economic independence, which denial is incompatible with national sovereignty.

The Soviet delegation believes that internal measures and the national efforts of each country should have a decisive importance for the countries of Europe and not make calculations for foreign support which should be of secondary importance. The Soviet Union has always counted above all on its own powers and is known to be on a steady way of progress of its economic life.

The first form of cooperation is based on the development of political and economic relations between states possessing equal rights and in that case their national sovereignty does not suffer from foreign interference.

Such is the democratic basis for international cooperation which brings nations closer together and facilitates the task of their mutual aid.

Source: U.S. Department of State, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Printing Office, 1985), 969.

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