As the scandal unfolded, President Reagan appointed a three-member commission to investigate the allegations. In addition to Senator Tower, the Tower Commission included Edmund Muskie, a former secretary of state, and Brent Scowcroft, a former national security adviser to President Ford. More than seventy witnesses testified, and Reagan appeared before the commission in December 1986. At the center of the scandal was Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a marine assigned to the National Security Council and the professed coordinator of the arms sales and the diversion of funds to the Contras. When the commission released its report in February 1987, it concluded that while Reagan should have been more directly aware of the actions of his advisers, he was not aware of the illegal diversion of funds to the Contras.
The President’s management style is to put the principal responsibility for policy review and implementation on the shoulders of his advisors. Nevertheless, with such a complex, high-risk operation and so much at stake, the President should have insured that the N.S.C. [National Security Council] system did not fail him. He did not force his policy to undergo the most critical review of which the N.S.C. participants and the process were capable. At no time did he insist upon accountability and performance review. Had the President chosen to drive the N.S.C. system, the outcome could well have been different. As it was, the most powerful features of the N.S.C. system—providing comprehensive analysis, alternatives, and follow-up—were not utilized. . . .
The board found considerable reason to question the actions of Lt. Col. North in the aftermath of the disclosure. The board has no evidence to either confirm or refute that Lt. Col. North destroyed documents on the initiative in an effort to conceal facts from threatened investigations. The board found indications that Lt. Col. North was involved in an effort, over time, to conceal or withhold important information. The files of Lt. Col. North contained much of the historical documentation that the board used to construct its narrative. Moreover, Lt. Col. North was the primary U.S. Government official involved in the details of the operation. The chronology he produced has many inaccuracies. These “histories” were to be the basis of the “full” story of the Iran initiative. These inaccuracies lend some evidence to the proposition that Lt. Col. North, either on his own or at the behest of others, actively sought to conceal important information.
Out of concern for the protection of classified material, [CIA] Director [William] Casey and [National Security Adviser Vice Admiral (VADM) John] Poindexter were to brief only the Congressional intelligence committees on the “full” story; [Casey] before the committees and VADM Poindexter in private sessions with the chairmen and vice chairmen. [Casey] and VADM Poindexter undertook to do this on November 21, 1986. It appears from the copy of [Casey’s] testimony and notes of VADM Poindexter’s meetings that they did not fully relate the nature of events as they had occurred. The result is an understandable perception that they were not forthcoming.
The board is also concerned about various notes that appear to be missing. VADM Poindexter was the official note taker in some key meetings, yet no notes for the meetings can be found. The reason for the lack of such notes remains unknown to the board. If they were written, they may contain very important information. We have no way of knowing if they exist.
Source: President’s Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report (New York: New York Times Books, 1987), 84–86.