After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the president abandoned his campaign promise to use U.S. troops cautiously and followed the counsel of his advisers. The violence that killed Kristen Breitweiser’s husband and thousands of others on that day changed the direction of U.S. foreign and domestic policies. The country undertook a war on terror, one that led to protracted and costly conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the erosion of civil liberties at home. As part of that effort, in 2002 Congress created a cabinet-level superagency, the Department of Homeland Security, responsible for developing a national strategy against further terrorist threats. Congress also enacted into law a key recommendation of the national commission that Breitweiser and the Jersey Girls pressured the government to establish. In 2004 Congress created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate the work of security agencies more effectively.

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Bush acted decisively. The president dispatched U.S. troops to Afghanistan, whose Taliban leaders refused to turn over Osama bin Laden and other terrorists operating training centers in the country. A combination of anti-Taliban warlords and U.S. military special forces, backed up by American aircraft, toppled the Taliban regime and installed a pro-American government; however, the United States did not immediately capture the elusive bin Laden, who escaped somewhere in the remote territory of Pakistan.

On the home front, the war on terror prompted passage of the Patriot Act in October 2001. The measure eased restrictions on domestic and foreign intelligence gathering and expanded the authority of law enforcement and immigration officials in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts. The act gave law enforcement agencies nearly unlimited authority to wiretap telephones, retrieve e-mail messages, and search the medical, financial, and library borrowing records of individuals, including U.S. citizens, suspected of involvement in terrorism overseas or at home. The computer age had provided terrorist networks like al-Qaeda with the means to communicate quickly through electronic mail and cell phones across national boundaries and to raise money and launder it into safe bank accounts online. Computer technology also gave U.S. intelligence agencies ways to monitor these communications and transactions.

Amid rising anti-Muslim sentiments, the overwhelming majority of Americans supported the Patriot Act. In the weeks and months following September 11, some people committed acts of violence against mosques, Arab American community centers and businesses, and individual Muslims and people thought to be Muslims (such as Sikhs). Near Chicago, a crowd of about three hundred anti-Arab youths waved flags, shouted “USA, USA,” and attempted to march on a mosque. In this atmosphere, some critics complained about the harsh provisions of the Patriot Act, comparing them to the measures restricting civil liberties during the Red scare following World War I. Nevertheless, in 2006 Congress renewed the act with only minor changes.

President Bush and his advisers, particularly Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, did not believe that the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan had ended the war on terror. Rather, they saw it as part of a larger plan to reshape the politics of the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions along pro-American lines. In doing so, the United States and its European allies would ensure the flow of cheap oil in order to satisfy the energy demands of consumers in these countries. Furthermore, by replacing authoritarian regimes with democratic governments in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration envisioned a domino effect that would lead to the toppling of reactionary leaders throughout the region. The establishment of pro-American, democratic nations, according to this strategy, would defeat extremist Islamic powers, thereby paving the way for resolving deep-seated, ongoing conflicts between Arabs and Israelis. In crafting this strategy, the Bush administration departed from the well-established, post–World War II policy of containing enemies short of going to war. Instead, the Bush Doctrine proposed undertaking preemptive war against despotic governments deemed a threat to U.S. national security, even if that danger was not imminent.

Following this doctrine, President Bush declared in January 2002 that Iraq was part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea. Although the United States had supported Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s war against Iran in the 1980s, Bush considered the Iraqi dictator to be in the same terrorist camp with Osama bin Laden. Little had changed in Iraq since the 1980s, but President Bush sought to complete the job that his father had started and then retreated from in the 1991 Gulf War—removing Hussein from power. The Iraqi leader was considered too undependable to protect U.S. oil interests in the region. Removing him would also open a path to overthrowing the radical Islamic government of neighboring Iran, which had embarrassed the United States in 1979 and remained its sworn enemy.

Over the next two years, Bush convinced Congress and a majority of the American people that Iraq presented an immediate danger to the security of the United States in its effort to fight global terrorism. He did so by falsely connecting Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorists. The president also accused Iraq of being well along the way to building and stockpiling “weapons of mass destruction.” Even after UN inspectors examined alleged nuclear and chemical weapons facilities in Iraq and found nothing harmful, the Bush administration remained adamant. Further, the government manipulated questionable intelligence information to defend its claims. In a speech to the United Nations based on dubious and inaccurate information, Secretary of State Powell charged that intelligence services had gathered direct evidence that Iraq was working on a nuclear device. See Document Project 29: The Uses of September 11.

Challenging the Bush administration’s assumptions and allegations about Iraq, antiwar critics staged mass demonstrations in major cities throughout the country, but with little success. Most Americans gave the president the benefit of the doubt. At the very least, they agreed with Bush that Saddam Hussein was “evil” and that his removal was justified. Thus in March 2003, after a congressional vote of approval, U.S. military aircraft unleashed massive bombing attacks on Baghdad as part of the Bush-Rumsfeld strategy of “shock and awe.” Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, in which the first President Bush had responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and led a broad coalition of nations, including Arab countries, the United States did not wait for any overt act of aggression and created merely a nominal alliance of nations, with only Great Britain supplying significant combat troops. Nevertheless, within weeks Hussein went into hiding, prompting Bush to declare that “major combat operations” had ended in Iraq.

This triumphant declaration proved premature, although Hussein was captured several months later. Despite the presence of 130,000 U.S. and 30,000 British troops, the war dragged on. More American soldiers (more than 4,000) died after the president proclaimed victory than had died during the invasion. The perception of the United States as an occupying power destabilized Iraq, leading to a civil war between the country’s Shi’ite Muslim majority, which had been persecuted under Saddam Hussein, and its Sunni minority, which Hussein represented. In the northern part of the nation, the Kurdish majority, another group brutalized by Hussein, also battled Sunnis. Moreover, al-Qaeda forces, which previously had been absent from the country, joined the fray.

The U.S. occupation and attempts at nation building, something that Bush during the 2000 campaign vowed he would not support, caused serious problems. American soldiers staffing jails containing Iraqi war prisoners, such as Abu Ghraib, were caught in photographs abusing their captives. The reconstituted Iraqi army and police lacked experience and harbored rebels within their ranks. Absent a military draft, Bush could not put sufficient active-duty troops into Iraq without exhausting them through extended tours of duty. In 2004 the military began relying on National Guard units to meet troop requirements, and they eventually constituted about 40 percent of the U.S. armed forces in Iraq. To make up for staffing shortages, the Pentagon outsourced to private companies jobs that would normally be performed by military personnel. American companies profited immensely from construction projects; from supplying troops with housing, meals, and uniforms; and from providing security for high-ranking military and diplomatic personnel. The Defense Department awarded contracts without competitive bidding to companies such as Halliburton, which had close ties to Vice President Cheney.

Amid a protracted war in Iraq, President Bush won reelection in 2004 by promising to finish the course of action he had started in Iraq. Bush argued that to do less would encourage terrorists, subvert burgeoning democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, and dishonor the troops who had been killed and wounded. Although the Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, criticized Bush’s handling of Iraq, Bush eked out a victory; however, this time, unlike four years before, the president won a majority of the popular vote (50.7 percent).