Artificially Scarce Goods

An artificially scarce good is excludable but nonrival in consumption.

An artificially scarce good is a good that is excludable but nonrival in consumption. As we’ve already seen, on-demand movies are a familiar example. The marginal cost to society of allowing an individual to watch the movie is zero, because one person’s viewing doesn’t interfere with other people’s viewing. Yet Netflix and companies like it prevent an individual from seeing an on-demand movie if he or she hasn’t paid. Goods like computer software or MP3s, which are valued for the information they embody (and are sometimes called “information goods”), are also artificially scarce.

As we’ve already seen, markets will supply artificially scarce goods: because they are excludable, the producers can charge people for consuming them.

But artificially scarce goods are nonrival in consumption, which means that the marginal cost of an individual’s consumption is zero. So the price that the supplier of an artificially scarce good charges exceeds marginal cost. Because the efficient price is equal to the marginal cost of zero, the good is “artificially scarce,” and consumption of the good is inefficiently low. However, unless the producer can somehow earn revenue for producing and selling the good, he or she will be unwilling to produce at all—an outcome that leaves society even worse off than it would otherwise be with positive but inefficiently low consumption.

Figure 17-4 illustrates the loss in total surplus caused by artificial scarcity. The demand curve shows the quantity of on-demand movies watched at any given price. The marginal cost of allowing an additional person to watch the movie is zero, so the efficient quantity of movies viewed is QOPT. Netflix charges a positive price, in this case $4, to unscramble the signal, and as a result only QMKT on-demand movies will be watched. This leads to a deadweight loss equal to the area of the shaded triangle.

An Artificially Scarce Good An artificially scarce good is excludable and nonrival in consumption. It is made artificially scarce because producers charge a positive price, but the marginal cost of allowing one more person to consume the good is zero. In this example, the market price of an on-demand movie is $4 and the quantity demanded at that price is QMKT. But the efficient level of consumption is QOPT, the quantity demanded when the price is zero. The efficient quantity, QOPT, exceeds the quantity demanded in an unregulated market, QMKT. The shaded area represents the loss in total surplus from charging a price of $4.

Does this look familiar? Like the problems that arise with public goods and common resources, the problem created by artificially scarce goods is similar to the problem of natural monopoly. A natural monopoly, you will recall, is an industry in which average total cost is above marginal cost for the relevant output range. In order to be willing to produce output, the producer must charge a price at least as high as average total cost—that is, a price above marginal cost. But a price above marginal cost leads to inefficiently low consumption.

ECONOMICS in Action: Blacked-Out Games

Blacked-Out Games

It was the first weekend of 2014 and the Green Bay Packers were hosting the San Francisco 49ers in the wild-card round of the National Football League playoffs. This was a very big game and football fans in Green Bay Wisconsin, known for their passionate devotion to their team, were shocked when a few days prior to the game, reports surfaced that the game was not sold out (a rare occurrence for such a popular team). Imagine a game that is being nationally televised by one of the major networks but Packer fans would flip to the local channel that is an affiliate of that network and instead of the game, would see some other show with a message scrolling across the bottom of the screen that the game has been blacked out in their area.

What the message wouldn’t say, but that Packer’s fans understood quite well, was that this blackout was at the insistence of the team’s owners, who didn’t want people who might have paid for tickets staying home and watching the game on TV instead. Often games that fail to sell out their stadium tickets are blacked out in local broadcast markets.

So the good in question—watching the game on TV—was made artificially scarce. Because the game was being broadcast anyway, no scarce resources would have been used to make it available in its immediate locality as well. But it wasn’t available—which meant a loss in welfare to those who would have watched the game on TV but were not willing to pay the price, in time and money, to go to the stadium.

Sometimes, though, accommodations are made in specific situations. In this case, enough Packers’ fans rallied in sub-zero temperatures that the NFL changed its policy, allowing football fans in the area to watch the game in real time in the warmth of their homes.

Quick Review

  • An artificially scarce good is excludable but nonrival in consumption.

  • Because the good is nonrival in consumption, the efficient price to consumers is zero. However, because it is excludable, sellers charge a positive price, which leads to inefficiently low consumption.

  • The problems of artificially scarce goods are similar to those posed by a natural monopoly.

17-4

  1. Question 17.6

    Xena is a software program produced by Xenoid. Each year Xenoid produces an upgrade that costs $300,000 to produce. It costs nothing to allow customers to download it from the company’s website. The demand schedule for the upgrade is shown in the accompanying table.

    Price of upgrade

    Quantity of upgrades demanded

    $180

    1,700

     150

    2,000

     120

    2,300

      90

    2,600

       0

    3,500

    1. What is the efficient price to a consumer of this upgrade? Explain your answer.

    2. What is the lowest price at which Xenoid is willing to produce and sell the upgrade? Draw the demand curve and show the loss of total surplus that occurs when Xenoid charges this price compared to the efficient price.

Solutions appear at back of book.

!worldview!Mauricedale Game Ranch and Hunting Endangered Animals to Save Them

John Hume’s Mauricedale ranch occupies 16,000 square miles in the hot, scrubby grasslands of South Africa. There Hume raises endangered species, such as rhinos, and nonendangered species, such as Cape buffalo, antelopes, hippos, giraffes, zebras, and ostriches. From revenues of around $2.5 million per year, the ranch earns a small profit, with 20% of the revenues coming from trophy hunting and 80% from selling live animals.

Although he entered this business to earn a profit, Hume sees himself as a conservator of these animals and this land. And he is convinced that to protect rhinos, some amount of legalized hunting of them is necessary. The story of one of Hume’s male rhinos, named “65,” illustrates his point. Hume and his staff knew that 65 was a problem: too old to breed, he was belligerent enough to kill younger male rhinos. He was part of what wildlife conservationists call the “surplus male problem,” a male whose presence inhibits the growth of the herd.

Eventually, Hume obtained permission for the hunting of 65 from CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species) that regulates the trade and legalized hunting of endangered species. A wealthy hunter paid Hume $150,000, and the troublesome 65 was quickly dispatched.

Conservationist ranchers like Hume, who advocate regulated hunting of wildlife, point to the experience of Kenya to buttress their case. In 1977, Kenya banned the trophy hunting or ranching of wildlife. Since then, Kenya has lost 60% to 70% of its large wildlife through poaching or conversion of habitat to agriculture. Its herd of black rhinos, once numbered at 20,000, now stands at about 540, surviving only in protected areas. In contrast, since regulated hunting of the less endangered white buffalo began in South Africa in 1968, its numbers have risen from 1,800 to 19,400.

Artur Tiutenko/Shutterstock

Many conservationists now agree that the key to recovery for a number of endangered species is legalized hunting on well-regulated game ranches that are actively engaged in breeding and maintaining the animals. As Dr. Rosie Cooney, head of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the world’s oldest and largest conservation group, recently said, “I’m afraid it would be nice to be able to recommend alternative approaches for conservation that don’t involve killing animals....[but] we view trophy hunting as playing an important and generally effective role in conservation.”

However, legalized hunting is a very controversial policy, strongly opposed by some wildlife advocates. Because establishing a ranch like Mauricedale requires a huge capital investment, many are concerned that smaller, fly-by-night ranches will engage in “canned hunts” with drugged or sick animals obtained elsewhere. And there is a fear that the high prices paid for trophy hunts will make ranchers too eager to cull their herds.

QUESTIONS FOR THOUGHT

  1. Question 17.7

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    Using the concepts you learned in this chapter, explain the economic incentives behind the huge losses in Kenyan wildlife.
  2. Question 17.8

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    Compare the economic incentives facing John Hume with those facing a Kenyan rancher.
  3. Question 17.9

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    What regulations should be imposed on a rancher who sells opportunities to trophy hunt? Relate these to the concepts in the chapter.