Private Information: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You

Private information is information that some people have but others do not.

Markets do very well at dealing with diversifiable risk and with risk due to uncertainty: situations in which nobody knows what is going to happen, whose house will be flooded, or who will get sick. However, markets have much more trouble with situations in which some people know things that other people don’t know—situations of private information. As we will see, private information can distort economic decisions and sometimes prevent mutually beneficial economic transactions from taking place. (Sometimes economists use the term asymmetric information rather than private information, but they are equivalent.)

Why is some information private? The most important reason is that people generally know more about themselves than other people do. For example, you know whether or not you are a careful driver; but unless you have already been in several accidents, your auto insurance company does not. You are more likely to have a better estimate than your insurance company of whether or not you will need an expensive medical procedure. And if you are selling me your used car, you are more likely to be aware of any problems with it than I am.

But why should such differences in who knows what be a problem? It turns out that there are two distinct sources of trouble: adverse selection, which arises from having private information about the way things are, and moral hazard, which arises from having private information about what people do.

Adverse Selection: The Economics of Lemons

Suppose that someone offers to sell you an almost brand-new car—purchased just three months ago, with only 2,000 miles on the odometer and no dents or scratches. Will you be willing to pay almost the same for it as for a car direct from the dealer?

Probably not, for one main reason: you cannot help but wonder why this car is being sold. Is it because the owner has discovered that something is wrong with it—that it is a “lemon”? Having driven the car for a while, the owner knows more about it than you do—and people are more likely to sell cars that give them trouble.

You might think that the fact that sellers of used cars know more about them than the buyers do represents an advantage to the sellers. But potential buyers know that potential sellers are likely to offer them lemons—they just don’t know exactly which car is a lemon. For this reason, buyers will offer a lower price than they would if they had a guarantee of the car’s quality. And this poor opinion of used cars tends to be self-reinforcing, precisely because it depresses the prices that buyers offer. Used cars sell at a significant discount because buyers expect a disproportionate share of those cars to be lemons.

How do I know whether or not this used car is a lemon?
iStock/Getty Images

Even a used car that is not a lemon would sell only at a large discount because buyers don’t know whether it’s a lemon or not. But potential sellers who have good cars are unwilling to sell them at a deep discount, except under exceptional circumstances. So good used cars are rarely offered for sale, and used cars that are offered for sale have a strong tendency to be lemons. (This is why people who have a compelling reason to sell a car, such as moving overseas, make a point of revealing that information to potential buyers—as if to say “This car is not a lemon!”)

Adverse selection occurs when an individual knows more about the way things are than other people do. Private information leads buyers to expect hidden problems in items offered for sale, leading to low prices and the best items being kept off the market.

The end result, then, is not only that used cars sell for low prices and that there are a large number of used cars with hidden problems. Equally important, many potentially beneficial transactions—sales of good cars by people who would like to get rid of them to people who would like to buy them—end up being frustrated by the inability of potential sellers to convince potential buyers that their cars are actually worth the higher price being asked. So some mutually beneficial trades between those who want to sell used cars and those who want to buy them go unexploited.

Although economists sometimes refer to situations like this as the “lemons problem,” the more formal name of the problem is adverse selection. The reason for the name is obvious: because the potential sellers know more about the quality of what they are selling than the potential buyers, they have an incentive to select the worst things to sell.

Adverse selection does not apply only to used cars. It is a problem for many parts of the economy—notably for insurance companies, and most notably for health insurance companies.

Suppose that a health insurance company were to offer a standard policy to everyone with the same premium. The premium would reflect the average risk of incurring a medical expense. But that would make the policy look very expensive to healthy people, who know that they are less likely than the average person to incur medical expenses. So healthy people would be less likely than less healthy people to buy the policy, leaving the health insurance company with exactly the customers it doesn’t want: people with a higher-than-average risk of needing medical care, who would find the premium to be a good deal.

In order to cover its expected losses from this sicker customer pool, the health insurance company is compelled to raise premiums, driving away more of the remaining healthier customers, and so on. Because the insurance company can’t determine who is healthy and who is not, it must charge everyone the same premium, thereby discouraging healthy people from purchasing policies and encouraging unhealthy people to buy policies.

As we discussed in Chapter 18, before the passage of the Affordable Care Act, adverse selection could lead to a phenomenon called an adverse selection death spiral as the market for health insurance collapsed: insurance companies refused to offer policies because there was no premium at which the company could cover its losses. Because of the severe adverse selection problems, governments in many advanced countries have assumed the role of providing health insurance to their citizens. In the United States, adverse selection in health insurance is avoided in two ways. First, U.S. government insurance programs, which provided almost half of the total payments for medical care in the United States in 2014, are financed by dedicated taxes which people cannot opt out of. Second, the ACA requires that everyone have health insurance, so healthy people cannot opt out of paying premiums.

Adverse selection can be reduced through screening: using observable information about people to make inferences about their private information.

However, adverse selection still exists in other insurance markets such as auto insurance. In general, people or firms faced with the problem of adverse selection follow one of several well-established strategies for dealing with it. One strategy is screening: using observable information to make inferences about private information. If you apply to purchase auto insurance, you’ll find that the insurance company will ask about your driving record in an attempt to “screen out” unsafe drivers—people they will refuse to insure or will insure only at very high premiums.

Auto insurance companies provide a very good example of the use of statistics in screening to reduce adverse selection. They may not know whether you are a careful driver, but they have statistical data on the accident rates of people who resemble your profile—and use those data in setting premiums. A 19-year-old male who drives a sports car and has already had a fender-bender is likely to pay a much higher premium than a 40-year-old female who drives an SUV and has never had an accident.

In some cases, this may be unfair: some adolescent males are very careful drivers, and some women drive SUVs as if they were F-16’s. But nobody can deny that the insurance companies are right on average.

Adverse selection can be diminished by people signaling their private information through actions that credibly reveal what they know.

Another strategy to counter the problems caused by adverse selection is for people who are good prospects to do something signaling their private information—taking some action that wouldn’t be worth taking unless they were indeed good prospects. For example, reputable used-car dealers often offer warranties—promises to repair any problems with the cars they sell that arise within a given amount of time. This isn’t just a way of insuring their customers against possible expenses; it’s a way of credibly showing that they are not selling lemons. As a result, more sales occur and dealers can command higher prices for their used cars.

A long-term reputation allows an individual to reassure others that he or she isn’t concealing adverse private information.

Finally, in the face of adverse selection, it can be very valuable to establish a good reputation: a used-car dealership will often advertise how long it has been in business to show that it has continued to satisfy its customers. As a result, new customers will be willing to purchase cars and to pay more for that dealer’s cars.

Moral Hazard

In the late 1970s, New York and other major cities experienced an epidemic of suspicious fires that appeared to be deliberately set. Investigators eventually became aware of patterns in a number of the fires. Particular landlords who owned several buildings seemed to have an unusually large number of their buildings burn down. Although it was difficult to prove, police suspected that most of these fire-prone landlords were hiring professional arsonists to torch their own properties.

Why burn your own building? These buildings were typically in declining neighborhoods, where rising crime and middle-class flight had led to a decline in property values. But the insurance policies on the buildings were written to compensate owners based on historical property values, and so would pay the owner of a destroyed building more than the building was worth in the current market. For an unscrupulous landlord who knew the right people, this presented a profitable opportunity.

The arson epidemic became less severe during the 1980s, partly because insurance companies began making it difficult to overinsure properties, and partly because a boom in real estate values made many previously arson-threatened buildings worth more unburned.

The arson episodes make it clear that it is a bad idea for insurance companies to let customers insure buildings for more than their value—it gives the customers some destructive incentives. You might think, however, that the incentive problem would go away as long as the insurance is no more than 100% of the value of what is being insured.

But, unfortunately, anything close to 100% insurance still distorts incentives—it induces policyholders to behave differently than they would in the absence of insurance. The reason is that preventing fires requires effort and cost on the part of a building’s owner. Fire alarms and sprinkler systems have to be kept in good repair, and fire safety rules have to be strictly enforced. All of this takes time and money that the owner may not find worth spending if the insurance policy will provide close to full compensation for any losses.

Of course, the insurance company could specify in the policy that it won’t pay if basic safety precautions have not been taken. But it isn’t always easy to tell how careful a building’s owner has been—the owner knows, but the insurance company does not.

Moral hazard occurs when an individual knows more about his or her own actions than other people do. This leads to a distortion of incentives to take care or to exert effort when someone else bears the costs of the lack of care or effort.

The point is that the building’s owner has private information about his or her own actions, about whether he or she has really taken all appropriate precautions. As a result, the insurance company is likely to face more claims than if it were able to determine exactly how much effort a building owner exerts to prevent a loss. The problem of distorted incentives arises when an individual has private information about his or her own actions but someone else bears the costs of a lack of care or effort. This is known as moral hazard.

To deal with moral hazard, it is necessary to give individuals with private information some personal stake in what happens so they have a reason to exert effort even if others cannot verify that they have done so. Moral hazard is the reason salespeople in many stores receive a commission on sales: it’s hard for managers to be sure how hard the salespeople are really working, and if they were paid only a straight salary, they would not have an incentive to exert effort to make those sales.

A deductible in an insurance policy is a sum that the insured individual must pay before being compensated for a claim.

Insurance companies deal with moral hazard by requiring a deductible: they compensate for losses only above a certain amount, so that coverage is always less than 100%. The insurance on your car, for example, may pay for repairs only after the first $500 in loss. This means that a careless driver who gets into a fender-bender will end up paying $500 for repairs even if he is insured, which provides at least some incentive to be careful and reduces moral hazard.

In addition to reducing moral hazard, deductibles provide a partial solution to the problem of adverse selection. Your insurance premium often drops substantially if you are willing to accept a large deductible. This is an attractive option to people who know they are low-risk customers; it is less attractive to people who know they are high-risk—and so are likely to have an accident and end up paying the deductible. By offering a menu of policies with different premiums and deductibles, insurance companies can screen their customers, inducing them to sort themselves out on the basis of their private information.

As the example of deductibles suggests, moral hazard limits the ability of the economy to allocate risks efficiently. You generally can’t get full (100%) insurance on your home or car, even though you would like to buy it, and you bear the risk of large deductibles, even though you would prefer not to. The following Economics in Action illustrates how in some cases moral hazard limits the ability of investors to diversify their investments.

ECONOMICS in Action: Franchise Owners Try Harder

Franchise Owners Try Harder

Franchise owners face risk, which motivates them to work harder than salaried managers.
©Tetra Images/Alamy

When Americans go out for a quick meal, they often end up at one of the fast-food chains—McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, Wendy’s, and so on. Because these are large corporations, most customers probably imagine that the people who serve them are themselves employees of large corporations. But usually they aren’t. Most fast-food restaurants—for example, 85% of McDonald’s outlets—are franchises. That is, some individual has paid the parent company for the right to operate a restaurant selling its product; he or she may look like an arm of a giant company but is in fact a small-business owner.

Becoming a franchisee is not a guarantee of success. You must put up a large amount of money, both to buy the license and to set up the restaurant itself. For example, in 2014 it cost between $1.1 and $2.2 million to open a McDonald’s franchise. And although McDonald’s takes care that its franchises are not too close to each other, they often face stiff competition from rival chains and even from a few truly independent restaurants. Becoming a franchise owner, in other words, involves taking on a lot of risk.

But why should people be willing to take these risks? Didn’t we just learn that it is better to diversify, to spread your wealth among many investments?

The logic of diversification would seem to say that it’s better for someone with $1.7 million to invest in a wide range of stocks rather than put it all into one Taco Bell. This implies that Taco Bell would find it hard to attract franchisees: nobody would be willing to be a franchisee unless they expected to earn considerably more than they would as a simple hired manager with their wealth invested in a diversified portfolio of stocks. So wouldn’t it be more profitable for Pizza Hut or Taco Bell simply to hire managers to run their restaurants?

It turns out that it isn’t, because the success of a restaurant depends a lot on how hard the manager works, on the effort he or she puts into choosing the right employees, on keeping the place clean and attractive to customers, and so on. The problem is moral hazard: the manager knows whether he or she is really putting 100% into the job; but company headquarters, which bears the costs of a poorly run restaurant, does not. So a salaried manager, who gets paid even without doing everything possible to make the restaurant a success, does not have the incentive to do that extra bit—an incentive the owner does have because he or she has a substantial personal stake in the restaurant’s success.

In other words, there is a moral hazard problem when a salaried manager runs a Pizza Hut, where the private information is how hard the manager works. Franchising solves this problem. A franchisee, whose wealth is tied up in the business and who stands to profit personally from its success, has every incentive to work extremely hard.

The result is that fast-food chains rely mainly on franchisees to operate their restaurants, even though the contracts with these owner-managers allow the franchisees on average to make much more than it would have cost the companies to employ store managers. The higher earnings of franchisees compensate them for the risk they accept, and the companies are compensated by higher sales that lead to higher license fees.

In addition, franchisees are forbidden by the licensing agreement with the company from reducing their risk by taking actions such as selling shares of the franchise to outside investors and using the proceeds to diversify. It’s an illustration of the fact that moral hazard prevents the elimination of risk through diversification.

Quick Review

  • Private information can distort incentives and prevent mutually beneficial transactions from occurring. One source is adverse selection: sellers have private information about their goods and buyers offer low prices, leading the sellers of quality goods to drop out and leaving the market dominated by “lemons.”

  • Adverse selection can be reduced by revealing private information through screening or signaling, or by cultivating a long-term reputation.

  • Another source of problems is moral hazard. In the case of insurance, it leads individuals to exert too little effort to prevent losses. This gives rise to features like deductibles, which limit the efficient allocation of risk.

20-3

  1. Question 20.4

    Your car insurance premiums are lower if you have had no moving violations for several years. Explain how this feature tends to decrease the potential inefficiency caused by adverse selection.

  2. Question 20.5

    A common feature of home construction contracts is that when it costs more to construct a building than was originally estimated, the contractor must absorb the additional cost. Explain how this feature reduces the problem of moral hazard but also forces the contractor to bear more risk than she would like.

  3. Question 20.6

    True or false? Explain your answer, stating what concept analyzed in this chapter accounts for the feature.

    People with higher deductibles on their auto insurance:

    1. Generally drive more carefully

    2. Pay lower premiums

    3. Generally are wealthier

Solutions appear at back of book.

The Agony of AIG

AIG (American International Group) was once the largest insurance company in the United States, known for insuring millions of homes and businesses and managing the pension plans of millions of workers. But in September 2008, AIG was at the epicenter of the crisis sweeping global financial markets because major commercial and investment banks faced potentially devastating losses through their transactions with AIG. Fearful that a chaotic bankruptcy of AIG would panic the already distressed financial markets, the Federal Reserve stepped in and orchestrated a $182 billion corporate bailout of AIG, the largest in U.S. history. In return, American taxpayers became owners of nearly 80% of AIG. How did things go so wrong?

AIG’s problems originated not in its main businesses—property insurance and pension management—but in its smaller Financial Products Division, which sold credit-default swaps, or CDS. A CDS is like an insurance policy for an investor who buys a bond. A bond is simply an IOU—a promise to repay on the part of the person or company that issued the bond. But any IOU carries the possibility that the borrower will default on the loan. So bond investors who wish to protect themselves against the risk of default purchases a CDS from a company like AIG. If the borrower defaults, bond investors collect an amount equal to their losses from the company that issued the CDS.

AP Photo/Clive Gee

In the mid-2000s, Joseph Cassano, the head of AIG’s Financial Products Division, sold hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CDSs to investors in mortgage-backed securities—bonds created by combining thousands of American home mortgages. Sales of CDSs made the Financial Products Division AIG’s most profitable department. And there were virtually no costs involved because mortgage defaults were low and the Financial Products Division was located in London, meaning that AIG was not required to abide by U.S. insurance regulations to set aside capital to cover potential losses—despite the fact that AIG, the parent company, was headquartered in the United States. As Cassano stated in 2007, “It is hard for us … to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions.” Cassano was so confident in his strategy and fearful of outside meddling that he prevented auditors from inspecting his books, leaving AIG’s management and shareholders in the dark about the risks they faced.

Yet the hard-to-see scenario appeared in 2008 when the U.S. housing market crashed. As mortgage defaults surged, investors in mortgage-backed securities incurred huge losses and turned to AIG to collect. But with no capital to cover claims, AIG faced bankruptcy until the U.S. government stepped in.

Banks such as Goldman Sachs, had made huge profits by putting together low-quality mortgage-backed securities with high likelihoods of default and then insuring them with AIG. Despite an outcry, Goldman’s claims were paid in full by the government because their transaction with AIG was entirely legal.

QUESTIONS FOR THOUGHT

  1. Question 20.7

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    Did AIG accurately assess the default risk that it insured? Why or why not?
  2. Question 20.8

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    What did AIG assume about the probabilities of defaults by different homeowners in the U.S. housing market? Were they wrong or right?
  3. Question 20.9

    XgWxiSANDs5SLAVxUgu2ubTCXPoI9YGyMA4wq7l5biLo4PgED+2Xx6YTtY8LpK4IP/gQ16f3QCoKWAb1Mw91ksX2kW0u9xq60BmjJJ0cOdp/rs0WP69rdOioZJinrBTQQjxyi3IR+/n5UVSLYMPai6HyvCbLBzIaQNxUtyxvZX/Kt/4Zin+l9irw6Zs3Rx7IyM9ZPmFWJsD/P8yM7EUxILWGEkWHz7NIJxkQmZhUsABanunL
    What are the examples of moral hazard in the case? For each example, explain who committed the moral hazard and against whom and identify the source of the private information.
  4. Question 20.10

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    Cite an example of adverse selection from the case. What was the source of the private information?