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The Enlightenment Debate on Religious Tolerance

Enlightenment philosophers questioned many aspects of European society, including political authority, social inequality, and imperialism. A major focus of their criticism was the dominance of the established church and the persecution of minority faiths. While many philosophers defended religious tolerance, they differed widely in their approaches to the issue.

It is, of course, the natural obligation of every mortal to diffuse knowledge and virtue among his fellow men, and to do his best to extirpate their prejudices and errors. One might think, in this regard, that it was the duty of every man publicly to oppose the religious opinions that he considers mistaken. But not all prejudices are equally harmful, and hence the prejudices we may think we perceive among our fellow men must not all be treated in the same way. Some are directly contrary to the happiness of the human race. . . . These must be attacked outright by every friend of humanity. . . . Of this kind are all people’s errors and prejudices that disturb their own or their fellows’ peace and contentment and kill every seed of the true and the good in man before it can germinate. On the one hand, fanaticism, misanthropy, and the spirit of persecution, and on the other, frivolity, luxury, and libertinism.

Sometimes, however, the opinions of my fellow men, which in my belief are errors, belong to the higher theoretical principles which are too remote from practical life to do any direct harm; but, precisely because of their generality, they form the basis on which the nation that upholds them has built its moral and social system, and thus happen to be of great importance to this part of the human race. To oppose such doctrines in public, because we consider them prejudices, is to dig up the ground to see whether it is solid and secure, without providing any other support for the building that stands on it. Anyone who cares more for the good of humanity than for his own fame will be slow to voice his opinion about such prejudices, and will take care not to attack them outright without extreme caution.

Some fanatic in the crowd cried out that Jean Calas had hanged his son Marc Antoine. The cry was soon repeated on all sides; some adding that the deceased was to have abjured Protestantism on the following day, and that the family and young Lavaisse had strangled him out of hatred of the Catholic religion. In a moment all doubt had disappeared. The whole town was persuaded that it is a point of religion with the Protestants for a father and mother to kill their children when they wish to change their faith.

. . . There was not, and could not be, any evidence against the family; but a deluded religion took the place of proof. . . . [The judges] were confounded when the old man, expiring on the wheel, prayed God to witness his innocence, and begged him to pardon his judges.

The daughters were taken from the mother and put in a convent. The mother, almost sprinkled with the blood of her husband, her eldest son dead, the younger banished, deprived of her daughters and all her property, was alone in the world, without bread, without hope, dying of the intolerable misery. Certain persons, having carefully examined the circumstances of this horrible adventure, were so impressed that they urged the widow, who had retired into solitude, to go and demand justice at the feet of the throne. . . . She reached Paris almost at the point of death. She was astonished at her reception, at the help and the tears that were given to her.

At Paris reason dominates fanaticism, however powerful it be; in the provinces fanaticism almost always overcomes reason.

523

NATHAN: Scarce was the father dead.

When each one with his ring appears

Claiming each the headship of the house.

Inspections, quarrelling, and complaints ensue;

But all in vain, the veritable ring

Was not distinguishable —

(After a pause, during which he expects the Sultan’s answer)

Almost as indistinguishable as to us,

Is now — the true religion.

SALADIN: What? Is that meant as answer to my question?

NATHAN:’Tis meant but to excuse myself, because

I lack the boldness to discriminate between the rings,

Which the father by express intent had made

So that they might not be distinguished.

SALADIN: The rings! Don’t play with me.

I thought the faiths which I have named

Were easily distinguishable,

Even to their raiment, even to meat and drink.

NATHAN: But yet not as regards their proofs:

For do not all rest upon history, written or traditional?

And history can also be accepted

Only on faith and trust. Is it not so?

Now, whose faith and confidence do we least misdoubt?

That of our relatives? Of those whose flesh and blood we are,

Of those who from our childhood

Have lavished on us proofs of love,

Who ne’er deceived us, unless ’twere wholesome for us so?

How can I place less faith in my forefathers

Than you in yours? or the reverse?

Can I desire of you to load your ancestors with lies,

So that you contradict not mine? Or the reverse?

And to the Christian the same applies.

Is that not so?

ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

Using the sources above, along with what you have learned in class and in this chapter, compare and contrast the views on religious toleration presented in the sources. On what would the authors of these works have agreed? How did their arguments in favor of toleration differ? What explanation can you offer for the differences you note?

Sources: (1) Ritchie Robertson, ed., The German-Jewish Dialogue: An Anthology of Literary Texts, 1749–1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 41–42; (2) Voltaire, A Treatise on Toleration and Other Essays, trans. Joseph McCabe (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1994), pp. 147–149, 152–153; (4) Crane Brinton, ed., The Portable Age of Reason Reader (New York: Viking Press, 1956), pp. 383–389.