Thinking Like a Historian: Army and Empire

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Army and Empire

Military might made it possible for the Romans to conquer and hold a huge empire. As the empire grew, the Romans needed to recruit troops from conquered areas and make these soldiers effective, loyal, and dependable. How did the Romans turn countless individuals from diverse cultures into the most powerful fighting force the Mediterranean world had ever seen?

1 Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, 50 B.C.E. In his account of his successful campaigns in Gaul, designed to present himself as the consummate Roman military leader, Caesar (writing of himself in the third person) describes his efforts to rally his wavering troops.

image Such a terrible panic suddenly seized our whole army as severely affected everyone’s courage and morale. Our men started asking questions, and the Gauls and traders replied by describing how tall and strong the Germans were, how unbelievably brave and skilful with weapons. . . . The panic began among the military tribunes and prefects, and the other men who, having no great military experience, had followed Caesar from Rome to court his friendship. . . . They hid themselves away in their tents and bemoaned their fate. . . . As soon as Caesar was aware of the situation he called a council, ordered centurions of all ranks to attend, and severely reprimanded them. . . . Why did they despair of their own courage, or of his anxious concern for their well-being? The danger posed by this enemy had already been experienced in the time of our fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutoni were expelled by Gaius Marius. On that occasion it was clear that the army had deserved as much credit as its commander. . . . From all this, said Caesar, they could see how crucial was firmness of purpose. . . . The Germans were the same people who had often clashed with the Helvetii — and the Helvetii had frequently beaten them, not only within their own borders but also in Germany itself — and yet the Helvetii had proved no match for our army. . . . And so, Caesar concluded, he would do at once what he had intended to put off till a later date. The very next night, during the fourth watch, they would strike camp. Then he would know as soon as possible whether their sense of shame and duty was stronger than their fear. . . . At the end of this speech the change of attitude was quite remarkable, and there arose an immense enthusiasm and eagerness to start the campaign.

2 Titus Flavius Josephus, The Jewish War, ca. 75 C.E. Josephus was a commander in the Jewish revolt against the Romans in 66 C.E. who after he was taken prisoner went over to the Roman side. Here he describes how he used the Romans as a model for the Jewish army. Like Caesar in Source 1, he writes of himself in the third person.

image Josephus knew that the invincible might of Rome was chiefly due to unhesitating obedience and to practice in arms. He despaired of providing similar instruction, demanding as it did a long period of training; but he saw that the habit of obedience resulted from the number of their officers, and he now reorganized his army on the Roman model, appointing more junior commanders than before. He divided the soldiers into different classes, and put them under decurions and centurions, those being subordinate to tribunes, and the tribunes to commanders of larger units. He taught them how to pass on signals, how to sound the advance and the retreat, how to make flank attacks and encircling movements, and how a victorious unit could relieve one in difficulties and assist any who were hard pressed. He explained all that contributed to toughness of body or fortitude of spirit. Above all he trained them for war by stressing Roman discipline at every turn: they would be facing men who by physical prowess and unshakable determination had conquered almost the entire world.

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3 Roman military diploma, 71 C.E. Military diplomas were bronze sheets, wired together, on which a former soldier’s tours of duty, record of service, and status as a citizen were recorded. One copy stayed in Rome, and one was sent to the soldier himself, much as members of the military today receive discharge papers.
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(The Israel Museum, Jerusalem/Acquired in memory of Chaim Herzog, Sixth President of the State of Israel, by his family and Yad Chaim Herzog; the Carmen and Louis Warschaw Fund of Archeological Acquisitions; David and Genevieve Hendin, New York/Bridgeman Images)
4 Roman legion roof plaque. The legionaries of the Twentieth Legion (Leg. XX) stationed in Britain, whose symbol was a charging boar, made this clay plaque for the roof of one of their buildings.
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(British Museum, London, UK/Erich Lessing/Art Resource, NY)
5 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, ca. 380–390 C.E. Vegetius seems to have been a Roman imperial bureaucrat who set out what he saw as ideal military recruitment and training at a point when the Roman Empire was in decline and the army faced many challenges.

image In every battle it is not numbers and untaught bravery so much as skill and training that generally produce the victory. For we see no other explanation of the conquest of the world by the Roman People than their drill-at-arms, camp-discipline and military expertise. . . . But what succeeded against all [enemies] was careful selection of recruits, instruction in the rules, so to speak, of war, toughening in daily exercises, prior acquaintance in field practice with all possible eventualities in war and battle, and strict punishment of cowardice. Scientific knowledge of warfare nurtures courage in battle. No one is afraid to do what he is confident of having learned well. A small force which is highly trained in the conflicts of war is more apt to victory: a raw and untrained horde is always exposed to slaughter. . . . The rural populace is better suited for arms. They are nurtured under the open sky in a life of work, enduring the sun, careless of shade, unacquainted with bathhouses, ignorant of luxury, simple souled, content with a little, with limbs toughened to endure every kind of toil. . . . If ancient custom is to be retained, everyone knows that those entering puberty should be brought to the levy. For those things are taught not only more quickly but even more completely which are learned from boyhood. Secondly military alacrity, jumping and running should be attempted before the body stiffens with age. . . . You need not greatly regret the absence of tall stature. It is more useful that soldiers be strong than big. . . . The youth in whose hands is to be placed the defence of provinces, the fortune of battles, ought to be of outstanding breeding if numbers suffice, and morals. Decent birth makes a suitable soldier, while a sense of shame prevents flight and makes him a victor.

ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE

  1. How does Julius Caesar use history and tradition in Source 1 to convince his troops to fight, and what do you think his purpose was in relating this incident as he did?
  2. What aspects of the Roman military does Josephus use as a model for his own forces in Source 2? How do these compare with the qualities Vegetius identifies in Source 5 as ideal in the perfect recruit?
  3. Why would the promise of eventual citizenship recorded in military diplomas, like the one in Source 3, have been an effective recruiting tool?
  4. What does the roof plaque in Source 4 suggest about the self-identity of the soldiers who made it?

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

Using the sources above, along with what you have learned in class and in Chapters 5 and 6, write a short essay that analyzes the military’s role in the empire’s expansion. How did the Romans turn countless individuals from diverse cultures into the most powerful fighting force the Mediterranean world had ever seen? How would you assess the relative importance of various factors in this transformation, and why might your assessment be different from that of the authors cited here?

Sources: (1) Julius Caesar, Seven Commentaries on the Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 24–27. By permission of Oxford University Press; (2) Josephus, The Jewish War, trans. G. A. Williamson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 172; (5) N. P. Milner, trans., Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996), pp. 2–8.