• The provisional government’s fatal decision to continue the war to protect Mother Russia after Tsar Nicolas’s abdication was initially greeted with some enthusiasm. As casualties continued to mount, however, the Russian army turned against Kerensky and his government. By October 1917 the soldiers, as the following readings suggest, were in open rebellion. On November 3, at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, which Trotsky attended, the Petrograd military garrison passed resolutions that sound like a Bolshevik revolutionary manifesto.

Conditions of the Troops at the Front

“Army Intelligence Report for October 2–13, 1917

Northern Front. The situation in the army has not changed and may be described as a complete lack of confidence in the officers and the higher commanding personnel. The belief is growing among the soldiers that they cannot be punished for what they do. . . . The influence of Bolshevik ideas is spreading very rapidly. To this must be added a general weariness, an irritability, and a desire for peace at any price. . . .

12th Army. The press of the political parties is no longer influencing the soldier masses. Again and again one hears the orders of the Provisional Government severely criticized. The committee of the 95th Regiment . . . declared Kerensky a traitor. . . .

Apart from the Bolshevik not a single [political] movement has any popularity. Those who read moderate newspapers are looked upon as [followers of the] “bourgeoisie” and “counter-revolutionists.” An intensive agitation is being conducted in favor of an immediate cessation of military operations on all fronts. Whenever a whole regiment or battalion refuses to carry out a military order, the fact is immediately made known to other parts of the army through special agitators. . . .

Western Front. . . . Because of general war weariness, bad nourishment, mistrust of officers, etc., there has developed an intense defeatist agitation accompanied by refusals to carry out orders, threats to the commanding personnel, and attempts to fraternize with Germans. Everywhere one hears voices calling for immediate peace, because, they say, no one will stay in the trenches during the winter. . . . [The rank and file hold] a deep-rooted conviction . . . that fraternization with the enemy is a sure way of attaining peace. . . .

The following general conclusions may be drawn from the reports of the commissars: The approaching winter campaign has accelerated the disintegration of the army and increased the longing for peace. It is necessary to leave nothing undone which might supply the soldiers with food, shoes, and winter clothing; to see that the army is reduced in numbers; to improve the discipline in the reserve regiments. Otherwise the ranks will be filled with such material as will lead to the complete demoralization and destruction of the army.”

Resolutions of the Petrograd Garrison

“Welcoming all the decisions of the Petrograd Soviet the Petrograd Garrison hereby declares:

The time for words is past. The country is on the verge of ruin. The army demands peace, the peasants land, and the workers bread and work. The Coalition Government is against the people. It became the tool of the enemies of the people. The time for words is past. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets must take the power into its own hands in order to give to the people peace, land, and bread. Only thus can the safety of the revolution and of the people be insured.

All power to the Soviets!

An immediate armistice on all fronts!

The land to the peasants!

An honest and prompt convocation of the Constituent Assembly!

The Petrograd Garrison gives its solemn promise to place at the disposal of the All-Russian Congress its entire strength even to the last man.

You may count on us — you who are the legitimate representatives of the soldiers, workers, and peasants. We are all at our posts ready to conquer or to die!”

Source: James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1918: Documents and Materials (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 24–25, 79.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS