All industrialized, technologically advanced countries have low fertility ratesand stabilized or declining populations, having passed through what is called the demographic transition (Figure 3.7). In preindustrial societies, birth and death rates were both high, resulting in almost no population growth. Because these were agrarian societies that depended on family labor, many children meant larger workforces, thus the high birth rates. But low levels of public health and limited access to health care, particularly for the very young, also meant high death rates. With the coming of the industrial era, medical advances and improvements in diet set the stage for a drop in death rates. Human life expectancy in industrialized countries soared from an average of 35 years in the eighteenth century to 75 years or more at present. Yet, birth rates did not fall so quickly, leading to a population explosion as fertility outpaced mortality. In Figure 3.7, this is shown in late stage 2 and early stage 3 of the model. Eventually, a decline in the birth rate is followed the decline in the death rate, slowing population growth. An important reason leadingto lower fertility levels involves the high cost of children in industrial societies, particularly because childhood itself becomes a prolonged period of economic dependence on parents. Finally, in the postindustrial period, the demographic transition produced zero population growth or actual population decline (Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8).

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Achieving lower death rates is relatively cost effective, historically requiring little more than the provision of safe drinking water and vaccinations against common infectious diseases. Lowering death rates tends to be uncontroversial and quickly achieved, demographically speaking. Getting birth rates to fall, however, can be far more difficult, especially for a government official who wants to be reelected. Birth control, abortion, and challenging long-held beliefs about family size can prove quite controversial, and political leaders may be reluctant to legislate them. Indeed, the Chinese implementation of its one-child-per-couple policy (see Subject to Debate, page 105) probably would not have been possible in a country with a democratically elected government. In addition, because it involves changing a cultural norm, the idea of smaller families can take three or four generations to become a reality. Increased educational levels for women are closely associated with falling fertility levels, as is access to various contraceptive devices (Figure 3.9).

The demographic transition is a model that predicts trends in birth rates, death rates, and overall population levels in the abstract. Yet, like many models used by demographers, it is based on the historical experience of western Europe: it is Eurocentric. It does a good job of describing changes in population patterns over time in Europe, as well as in other wealthy regions. However, it has several shortcomings. First is the inexorable stage-by-stage progression implicit in the model. Have countries or regions ever skipped a stage or regressed? Certainly. The case of China shows how policy, in this case government-imposed restrictions on births, can fast-forward an entire nation to stage 4 (again, see the Subject to Debate feature). War, too, can cause a returnto anearlier stage in the model by increasing deathrates. For instance, Angola and Afghanistan are two countrieswithrecent histories of conflict; both had topped the world’s death rate list until recently. In other cases, wealth has not led to declining fertility. Thanks to oil exports, residents of Oman enjoy relatively high average incomes. But fertility, too, remains relatively high at nearly 3 children per woman in 2013. Indeed, the Population Reference Bureau has pointed to a “demographic divide” between countries where the demographic transition model applies well, and others—mostly poorer countries or those experiencing widespread conflict or disease—where birth and death rates do not necessarily follow the model’s predictions. Even in Europe, there are countries where fertility has dropped precipitously, while at the same time death rates have escalated. In countries such as Russia, which, according to Peter Coclanis, has “somehow managed to reverse the so-called demographic transition,” the model itself must be questioned.

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