Throughout South Asia’s history, supporters of opposing political ideologies—for instance, religious freedom versus a religious state—commonly tried to resolve their differences through violence. The most successful paths out of these conflicts have been those in which opposing groups managed to compete peacefully in democratic elections. Nevertheless, every South Asian country and every foreign country that has intervened in the region’s politics have missed opportunities to resolve conflicts through democratic means, resorting instead to the use of force (see Figure 8.20A, B).

A particularly virulent source of conflict within all South Asian countries is corruption, often linked to purposeful bureaucratic inefficiency, especially the soliciting of bribes to perform a service. A number of movements to address conflict and corruption are becoming popular among the increasingly politically aware middle class. Because more people are now employed in the private sector instead of in government-owned industries, more people have the courage to challenge government officials.

The Hindu–Muslim Relationship Indian independence leaders like Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru (first prime minister of India, 1947–1964) emphasized the common cause of throwing off British rule that once united Muslim and Hindu Indians. Since independence, members of the Muslim upper class have been prominent in Indian national government and the military. Muslim generals have served India willingly, even in its wars with Pakistan after Partition. Hindus and Muslims often interact amicably, and they occasionally marry each other. Both groups have influenced the region’s cuisine (see Figure 8.28).

But there is a dark side to the Hindu–Muslim relationship. At the community level in South Asia, relations between the region’s two largest religious groups are often quite tense. In some Indian villages, Hindus may regard Muslims as members of low castes. Religious rules about food are often the source of discord because dietary habits are a primary means of distinguishing caste. After Partition in 1947, some wealthy Hindu landowners remained in what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In some Bangladeshi villages today, Hindus are often somewhat wealthier even though Muslims may be a majority. Although the two groups may coexist amicably for many years, they view each other as different, and conflict resulting from religious or economic disputes—euphemistically called communal conflict—can erupt over seemingly trivial events, as described in the following vignette.

At the state and national level, Hindu–Muslim conflict has taken on strong political overtones, aspects of which are discussed below.

The association of a particular religion with a particular territory or political unit—be it a neighborhood, a city, or an entire country—to the exclusion of other religions, is commonly called religious nationalism. The ultimate goal of such movements is often political control over a given territory.

Although both India and Pakistan were formally created as secular states, religious nationalism has been a reality in both countries, shaping relations between people and their governments. Rejecting the idea of multiculturalism, and referring back to the days of Partition, India is increasingly thought of as a Hindu state, while Pakistan calls itself an Islamic Republic, and Bangladesh a People’s Republic. In each country, many people in the dominant religious group strongly associate their religion with their national identity.

In India, urban men from middle- and upper-caste groups are the predominant supporters of Hindu nationalism (sometimes called Hindutva). Hindutva proponents not only promote Hinduism, they fear the erosion of their castes’ political influence and particularly resent the extension of the quota system for government jobs and admission to universities to lower-caste groups (see earlier in this chapter). Conflict results because politically mobilized lower castes and members of other religious groups are no longer willing to follow the dictates of the dominant castes.

Political parties based on religious nationalism have gained popularity throughout South Asia. Although their members think of these parties, such as the Bharatiya Janata Parishad (BJP) in India, as forces that will purge their country of corruption and violence, they are usually no less corrupt or violent than secular parties.

Movements Against Government Inefficiency and Corruption In recent years, reform movements have been developed by the many South Asians who have been frustrated by government inefficiency, corruption, religious nationalism, caste politics, and the failure of governments to deliver on their promises of broad-based prosperity. Bureaucrats who demand bribes have lately been the focus of such activism. Confronted by a bureaucrat who asked for nearly $200 to issue a legitimate income tax refund, one Indian couple in Bangalore launched the Web site I Paid a Bribe, aimed at collecting information about crooked officials. The idea caught on quickly and similar sites now exist in more than 17 countries. Anna Hazare of Maharashtra, a former military man who advocates that those convicted of corruption lose a hand as punishment, is a more militant anticorruption crusader in India. Although most Indians quickly backed off such extreme measures, Hazare, despite his extremism, has attracted a following in the new middle class, especially among educated women, who are increasingly active in politics.

Two aspects of the high-tech revolution in South Asia are likely to make corruption more difficult for bureaucrats and elected officials. The first is the spread of cell phones and their use in banking and money transfers, which will now be more traceable. The second is the Aadhaar Project, an ambitious effort to provide all 1.2 billion Indians with a unique photo/digitized ID card (UID). By October of 2012, a total of 208 million cards had been issued, with complete coverage of India expected before 2020. The UID project is designed to facilitate the distribution of government benefits of all types, much of which currently fails to reach the poorest people because there are few formal records that can be used to identify them. Currently, much of the money intended to reach these people ends up in the hands of corrupt officials.

In the state elections of 2012, women and young voters were particularly active, coming to the polls in large numbers, with specific issues and candidates in mind. In several of the largest states, voter turnout was 50 percent higher than it had been in the past. The anticorruption movements mentioned above, widely covered in the press and by Web sites, apparently motivated voters. Large numbers of new voters, at least a third of whom are 18 to 19 years old, have recently registered to vote. These educated and urbanized voters, male and female, who have far more access to information than voters have had in the past, could usher in a new political era.

The most intense armed conflicts in South Asia today are regional conflicts in which nations dispute territorial boundaries or a minority actively resists the authority of a national or state government. Most of these hostilities arise from the authoritarian tendencies of governments that at times work against the growth of political freedoms that might otherwise defuse political tensions.

Conflict in Kashmir Since 1947 and the post-independence dividing of India and Pakistan, between 60,000 and 100,000 people have been killed in violence in Kashmir. At the root of the violence is a struggle for territory between India and Pakistan, neither of which is willing to let the people of Kashmir resolve the dispute democratically (see the Figure 8.20 map).

For many years, Kashmir has been a Muslim-dominated area, and in 1947, some Kashmiris believed that it should be turned over to Pakistan for this reason. Although the Hindu maharaja (king) of Kashmir wanted Kashmir to remain independent at the time, the most popular Kashmiri political leader and significant portions of the populace favored joining India. They preferred India’s stated ideals of having a secular government to Pakistan’s less robust safeguards for religious freedom. When Pakistan-sponsored raiders invaded western Kashmir in 1947, the maharaja quickly agreed to join India. A brief war between Pakistan and India resulted in a cease-fire line that became a tenuous boundary.

Pakistan attempted to invade Kashmir again in 1965 but was defeated. India and Pakistan are technically still waiting for a UN decision about the final location of the border (Figure 8.20C). The Ladakh region of Kashmir (see the Figure 8.1 map) is the object of a more limited border dispute between India and China.

After years of military occupation, most Kashmiris now support independence from both India and Pakistan. However, neither country is willing to hold a vote on the matter. Anti-Indian Kashmiri guerrilla groups equipped with weapons and training from Pakistan have carried out many bombings and assassinations. Blunt counterattacks launched by the Indian government have killed large numbers of civilians and alienated many Kashmiris.

Another complication in the Kashmir dispute is the fact that both India and Pakistan—which came close to war against each other in 1999 and again in 2002—have nuclear weapons. Because of the nationalistic fervor of the protagonists, many see the conflict in Kashmir as more likely to result in the use of nuclear weapons than any other conflict in the world. Analysts agree that any use at all of nuclear weapons would have severe repercussions for everyone on Earth.

War and Reconstruction in Afghanistan In the 1970s, political debate in Afghanistan became polarized. On one side were several factions of urban elites, who favored modernization and varying types of democratic reforms. Opposing them were rural, conservative religious leaders, whose positions as landholders and ethnic leaders were threatened by the proposed reforms. Divisions intensified as successive governments, all of which came to power through military coups, became more and more authoritarian. Political opponents were imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the thousands, resulting in a growing insurgency outside the major cities.

In 1979, fearing that a civil war in Afghanistan would destabilize neighboring Soviet republics in Central Asia, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Rural conservative leaders (often erroneously called “warlords”) and their followers formed an anti-Soviet resistance group, the mujahedeen. As Afghan resistance to Soviet domination increased, the mujahedeen became ever more strongly influenced by militant Islamist thought and by Persian Gulf Arab activists who provided funding and arms. At the time, the United States, still searching for Cold War allies against the Soviet Union, joined with Pakistan in supporting the mujahedeen. Moderate, educated Afghans who favored democratic reforms fled the country during this turbulent time, hoping to go back eventually when peace returned.

In 1989, after heavy losses—14,000 Soviet soldiers killed and billions of dollars wasted—the Soviets gave up and left Afghanistan. Anarchy prevailed for a time as mujahedeen factions fought one another, adding to the 1.5 million civilians and combatants killed in the war with the Soviets.

In the early 1990s, a radical religious, political, and military movement called the Taliban emerged from among the mujahedeen. The Taliban wanted to control corruption and crime and minimize Western ways—especially those related to the role, status, and dress of women—that had been introduced in earlier decades by the urban elites and reinforced or made more extreme by the Russian occupation. The Taliban wanted to strictly enforce shari’a, the Islamic social and penal code (see Chapter 6). Efforts by the Taliban to purge Afghan society of non-Muslim influences included greatly restricting women, promoting only fundamentalist Islamic education, and publicly banning the production of opium, to which many Afghan men had become addicted, all the while privately promoting its sale to raise funds for their side. By 2001, the Taliban controlled 95 percent of the country, including the capital, Kabul.

198. TALIBAN INSURGENCY FUELED BY POPPY CULTIVATION

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies focused on removing the Taliban, who were giving shelter to Osama bin Laden and his international Al Qaeda network. By late 2001, the Taliban were overpowered by an alliance of Afghans supported heavily by the United States, the United Kingdom, and eventually by NATO (see the Figure 8.20 map).

In 2003, the United States launched the war in Iraq that diverted national attention, troops, and financial resources away from Afghanistan. Almost immediately the Taliban were back again, effectively thwarting the ability of Afghanistan’s new government to ensure security and to meet the needs of people outside Kabul. Based in rural areas in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Taliban are now aided by widespread distrust of the government in Kabul, which is seen as corrupt (see Figure 8.20A). It appears that most people in Afghanistan favor a democratic government based on Muslim principles, but functionally flawed elections beginning in 2004 have resulted in an ever-lower voter turnout, diminishing from 7.4 million in 2004 to 3.2 million in 2010. The next presidential elections were scheduled for 2014.

In May of 2011, bin Laden was killed in a raid by U.S. forces in the town of Abbottabad, Pakistan. Another raid killed the next-highest Al Qaeda commander, and sporadic drone attacks killed both combatants and civilians. The United States took these actions without the knowledge or consent of Pakistani authorities, which suggests a weakening of the U.S.–Pakistani alliance in the so-called War on Terror. With the threat from Al Qaeda seemingly diminished, calls within the United States for a faster withdrawal from Afghanistan increased; withdrawal is now underway and scheduled to be completed in 2014 (see Chapter 2), though the withdrawal is unlikely to be total.

Sri Lanka’s Civil War The Singhalese have dominated Sri Lanka since their migration from Northern India several thousand years ago. Today they make up about 74 percent of Sri Lanka’s population of 20.5 million people. Most Singhalese are Buddhist. Tamils, a Hindu ethnic group from South India, make up about 18 percent of the total population of Sri Lanka. About half of these Tamils have been in Sri Lanka since the thirteenth century, when a Tamil Hindu kingdom was established in the northeastern part of the island. The other half were brought over by the British in the nineteenth century to work on tea, coffee, and rubber plantations. Some Tamils have done well, especially in urban areas, where they dominate the commercial sectors of the economy. However, many others have remained poor laborers isolated on rural plantations.

Upon its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka had a thriving economy led by a vibrant agricultural sector and a government that made significant investments in health care and education. It was poised to become one of Asia’s most developed economies. But, driven by nationalism, Singhalese was made the only official language and Tamil plantation workers were denied the right to vote. Efforts were also made to deport hundreds of thousands of Tamils to India. In the 1960s, the government shifted investment away from agricultural development and toward urban manufacturing and textile industries, which were dominated by Singhalese. By 1983, the Tamil minority, lacking political power and influence, chose to use guerilla warfare against the Singhalese, mounting an army known as the Tamil Tigers.

For more than 30 years, the entire island was subjected to repeated terrorist bombings and kidnappings. Peace agreements were attempted several times, but in the end it was an overwhelming military victory by the government, combined with an effective crackdown on international funding for the Tamils, that forced the Tamil surrender in May of 2009. However, dissatisfaction with the peace process has resulted in an ongoing flow of Tamil and other refugees from Sri Lanka (see Figure 8.20B).

Despite many years of violence that severely curtailed the tourist industry, economic growth in other sectors has been surprisingly robust in Sri Lanka. Driven by strong growth in food processing, textiles, and garment making, Sri Lanka is today one of the wealthiest nations in South Asia on a per capita GDP basis, and it provides for the human well-being of its citizens.

Nepal’s Rebels After a civil war that ended generations of monarchical rule, Nepal has endured years of political turmoil. An elected legislature and multiparty democracy were introduced into Nepal in 1990, but until 2008, a royal family governed with little respect for the political freedoms of the Nepalese people.

In 1996, inspired by the ideals of the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong (but with no apparent support from China), Maoist revolutionaries took advantage of public discontent and waged a “people’s war” against the Nepalese monarchy. Following a decade of civil war, during which 13,000 Nepalese died, the Maoists had both military control of much of the countryside and strong political support from most Nepalese. Persistent poverty and lack of the most basic development under the dictatorial rule of the latest monarch, King Gyanendra (see Figure 8.20D), led to massive protests that forced Gyanendra to step down in 2006. Soon thereafter, the Maoists declared a cease-fire with the government.

In 2008, the Maoists won sweeping electoral victories that gave them a majority in parliament and made their former rebel leader prime minister. Then, in May of 2009, when his many conditions for reforming Nepalese society remained unmet, the Maoist prime minister resigned in a tactical parliamentary move and took his party into opposition against a new prime minister and his weak 22-party coalition. Although the Maoist opposition agreed to participate in writing a new constitution, divisive issues relating to power sharing and dividing the country into ethnic states have obstructed the creation of a broadly acceptable constitution. Observers concur, however, that if the various factions can see that peaceful democratic processes will give them a voice, Nepal will probably not return to civil war. 200. FUTURE OF NEPAL’S KING GYANENDRA IN QUESTION

Caste and Politics Despite decades of effort to fight the influence of caste, politics in India are still dramatically influenced by caste. In the twentieth century, Mohandas Gandhi began an organized effort to eliminate discrimination against “untouchables.” As a result, India’s constitution bans caste discrimination. However, in recognition that caste is still hugely influential in society, India began an affirmative action program upon independence from Britain. The program reserves a portion of government jobs, places in higher education, and parliamentary seats for Dalits and Adivasis. Together, the two groups now constitute approximately 23 percent of the Indian population and are guaranteed 22.5 percent of government jobs. Extended in 1990, this program now includes other socially and educationally “backward castes” (the term used in India), such as disadvantaged jatis of the Sudras caste, allotting them an additional 27 percent of government jobs. However, reserving nearly half of government jobs in this way has resulted in considerable controversy. In 2006, medical students successfully protested against quotas in elite higher-education institutions for lower-caste applicants. The Indian Supreme Court ruled in favor of the students.

At the local level, most political parties design their vote-getting strategies to appeal to subcaste loyalties. They often secure the votes of entire jati communities with political favors such as new roads, schools, or development projects. These arrangements fly in the face of the official ideologies of the major political parties and of Indian government policies, which actively work to eliminate discrimination on the basis of caste. Nevertheless, the role of caste in politics seems to be increasing at this time; several new political parties that explicitly support the interests of low castes have emerged.

Among educated people in urban areas, the campaign to eradicate discrimination on the basis of caste may appear to have succeeded, but the reality is more complex. Throughout the country, there are now some Dalits serving in powerful government positions. Members of high and low castes ride city buses side by side, eat together in restaurants, and attend the same schools and universities. For some urban Indians—especially educated professionals who meet in the workplace—caste is deemphasized as the crucial factor in finding a marriage partner. However, less than 5 percent of marriages cross even jati lines, let alone the broader gulf of varna. Nearly everyone notices the tiny social clues that reveal an individual’s caste, and in rural areas, where the majority of Indians still reside, the divisions of caste remain prevalent.