Making Historical Arguments: How Did the New Deal Contribute to National Defense?

How Did the New Deal Contribute to National Defense?

The New Deal strengthened the nation by providing relief and employment. In the 1930s, most New Dealers and most Americans believed the biggest threats to the nation were domestic poverty and unemployment, not foreign nations. In contrast, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union aggressively built up their military might during this period. Germany, for example, multplied its military spending by a factor of thirty-eight; the Soviet Union, by a factor of twenty. An American congressional leader expressed the common view: “Why should we build up our Navy . . . when it will have nothing to do after we have built it. . . . No wars [are going on] now and no war is in sight.” Consequently, American military spending barely doubled during the 1930s.

Americans’ complacency about foreign threats worried military planners, who believed that Japan in particular posed a dangerous military challenge to American interests. During the 1930s, Japanese military spending multiplied by nine, with the vast majority before 1937 going to the Japanese navy; the Japanese army got a larger share after 1937 when military conquests in Asia required more soldiers. According to American military planners, the U.S. Navy — not the army — needed to be rebuilt and modernized to counter the threat from Japan.

After World War I, the United States drastically shrank its military. By 1930, American armed forces numbered about 230,000 soldiers and sailors, less than half the size of Italy’s military, even though the U.S. population was three times larger than Italy’s. International treaties signed after World War I limited the size of the navies of the major powers to prevent a naval arms race that might lead to war. Both German and Japanese navies exceeded their treaty limits, but during the 1920s the U.S. fleet numbered only about 75 percent of the ships permitted by treaty. Congress and Republican presidents during the 1920s had no desire to build expensive warships, especially after the Great Depression struck. Most Americans agreed, sharing the view of a British leader in 1931 that “war was never more remote, nor peace more secure.”

Unlike his predecessors, President Roosevelt had long advocated naval power, a view strengthened by his service as assistant secretary of the navy during the Wilson administration. Soon after his election, a battleship captain privately wrote Roosevelt, “Take good care of Uncle Sam’s Navy! We have long been in need of a friend . . . in the White House.” Lacking congressional support for rebuilding the fleet, Roosevelt and his advisers attached a provision for building thirty-two new warships (including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) by siphoning $238 million from the $3.3 billion appropriated in June 1933 for the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Roosevelt and many New Dealers justified the expenditure as a public works program that would combat unemployment and preserve the skilled workforce at the nation’s largest private shipyards.

Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins explained that “the Navy is part of the public works project, and the purpose of the [NIRA] is not to build ships but to give employment.” When many more millions were earmarked from Public Works Administration (PWA) funds for naval aircraft and renovation of shore stations, Harold Ickes, the head of the PWA, fumed, “I hate to see $70 million go into one battleship when we are having difficulty keeping our people from starving.” Roosevelt’s supporters — who included the navy, private shipyards, and congressional advocates of naval power — argued that PWA funds were better spent to “get some kind of decent Navy than . . . to rake leaves.” However, Ickes and other critics continued to denounce Roosevelt’s sweetheart deal with the navy. “The Navy has more Public Works money tied up than any one else,” Ickes thundered, adding, “There isn’t enough money in the United States Treasury to satisfy the Navy.”

Naval rearmament masquerading as public works was only the beginning of New Deal support for naval shipbuilding. In March 1934, Roosevelt signed the Vinson-Trammell Naval Act, named for its congressional sponsors. The act authorized the navy to build an additional 102 warships that would bring the navy up to treaty limits. The Naval Expansion Act four years later provided for a 20 percent expansion of the fleet beyond treaty limits and up to 3,000 aircraft. Overall, between 1933 and 1939, the New Deal increased the number of aircraft carriers and cruisers by 40 percent and modern destroyers by 1,500 percent. Although the fleet expanded enormously beyond 1939 levels during World War II, the New Deal built the navy into a powerful force for national defense that became more crucial than ever after 1939 as war clouds gathered in Europe and the Pacific.

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Big Guns Roosevelt loved to tour navy ships both in port and at sea. Here the commander in chief—the Big Gun, so to speak—posed under the big guns of a battleship that he believed were needed in much larger numbers to defend the nation. The photograph promoted Roosevelt’s campaign to assert presidential leadership in order to overcome isolationist sentiment, rebuild the navy, and protect the nation’s interests around the world.
Bettmann/Corbis.

Questions for Analysis

Summarize the Argument: How did the New Deal contribute to national defense?

Analyze the Evidence: What New Deal measures authorized naval rearmament? How did critics respond to these measures?

Consider the Context: How did New Deal domestic programs influence naval rearmament?