The Executive Committee of the National Security Council — ExComm for short — was created during the missile crisis to gather White House and other advisers tasked to come up with U.S. responses. It lost influence as the crisis became public and back-channel negotiations began, but remained an important forum for sharing information. Here the “wise men” gathered by President Kennedy discuss how to respond to contradictory Soviet proposals. On the same day as this document, the Kennedy government publicly agreed to end its blockade and not attack Cuba if the Soviets removed all their missiles from the island and secretly agreed to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Cabinet Room
[The committee is in a discussion about tactical questions, which is interrupted a few minutes into the meeting as the president reads a news ticker item.]
John Kennedy: [Reading] Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy yesterday he would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba if the United States withdrew its rockets from Turkey.
. . .
John Kennedy: That wasn’t clear in the letter we received, was it?
Unidentified voice: No.
. . .
George Ball: . . . We would have to work it out with the Turks on the basis of putting a Polaris in the waters, and even that might not be enough according to the judgment that we’ve had on the spot. We’ve got a — we’ve got one paper on it already, and we’re having put in under a NATO decision, and [words unclear]. . . .
. . .
McGeorge Bundy: [interrupting] It’s very odd, Mr. President, if he’s [Khrushchev] changed his terms from a long letter to you and an urgent appeal from the Counselor [Aleksandr Fomin] only last night, set in a purely Cuban context, it seems to me we’re well within our — there’s nothing wrong with our posture in sticking to that line.
John Kennedy: But let’s wait and assume that this is an accurate report of what he’s now proposing this morning — there may have been changes over there — a change over there.
. . .
McGeorge Bundy: I would answer back saying I would prefer to deal with your — with your interesting proposals of last night.
John Kennedy: Well now that’s just what we ought to be thinking about. We’re going to be in an insupportable position in this matter if this becomes his proposal. In the first place, we last year tried to get the missiles out of there [Turkey] because they’re not militarily useful, number one. Number two, it’s going to — to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man it will look like a very fair trade deal.
Paul Nitze: I don’t think so. I don’t think — I think you would get support from the United Nations on the proposition, “Deal with this Cuban thing.” We’ll talk about other things later, but I think everybody else is worried that they’ll be included in this great big trade, and it goes beyond Cuba. . . .
Dean Rusk: [interrupting] That’s true of the Allies; it would not be true of the neutrals.
McGeorge Bundy: No.
. . .
Paul Nitze: Isn’t it possible that they’re going on a dual track, one a public track and the other a private track; the private track is related to [word unclear], and the public track is one that’s in order to confuse the public scene [words unclear] additional pressures.
John Kennedy: Possible . . .
. . .
John Kennedy: . . . [We] first ought to get clarification from the Soviet Union of what they’re talking, at least give us — as I say you’re going to find a lot of people think this a rather reasonable condition.
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John Kennedy: He’s put this out in a way that’s caused maximum tension and embarrassment. It’s not as if it was a private proposal, which would give us an opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. He’s put it out in a way that the Turks are bound to say they don’t agree to this. [Words unclear]
. . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t see how we can ask the Turks to give up their defense
Unidentified voice: What do you think they could . . .
Robert Kennedy: No —uh — [word unclear] unless the Soviet Union is also going to give up their — uh —
Voices: weapons.
Robert McNamara: Not only the weapons, but agree not to invade Turkey.
[Voices overlapping]
Robert McNamara: And allow inspection to ensure that they haven’t.
Robert Kennedy: We would be glad for it [voices overlapping]. We think that’s a very good point made by the Russians, and we would be glad to — and we finally feel that this is a major breakthrough and we would be glad to discuss that. In the meantime this is a threat to the United States and not just that — to all of Latin America and let’s get that done.
. . .
[Reel of tape ends soon after and the next reel begins with low voices and side conversations, not clear — president not present. The gathering comes to order after about five minutes.]
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Robert McNamara: How can we negotiate with somebody who changes his deal before we even get a chance to reply and announces publicly the deal before we receive it?
McGeorge Bundy: I think there must have been an overruling in Moscow.
. . .
McGeorge Bundy: This should be knocked down publicly. A private — let me suggest this scenario — we knock this down publicly in the way we’ve just described, separating the issues, keeping attention on Cuba, and the four-point reply that Bob [McNamara] has framed. Privately we say to Khrushchev, “Look — uh — your public statement is a very dangerous one because — uh — it makes impossible immediate discussion of your private proposals and requires us to proceed urgently with the things that we have in mind. You’d better get straightened out.”
Unidentified voice: This is exactly what I’d say.
John McCone: I think that’s exactly right.
Unidentified voice: And we release the fact that there was the other letter?
McGeorge Bundy: No, we don’t. . . .
. . .
Robert Kennedy: What is the advantage? I don’t know what — where you are in 24 hours from now — uh — so we win that argument but what 24 hours . . .
[Voices]
Robert McNamara: We incorporate a new deal in our letter.
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Robert Kennedy: I’d like to have the consideration of my thoughts [words unclear]. He’s offered this deal — uh — [words unclear] that he will withdraw the bases in Cuba for assurance that we don’t intend to invade. We’ve always given those assurances. We will be glad to give them again. He said, in his letter to me, he said that we were to permit inspection. Obviously that entails inspection not only of Cuba but entails inspection of the United States to ensure that we’re not — by United Nations observers — to ensure that we’re not getting ready to — uh — invade. Now this one of the things [United Nations Secretary General] U Thant — the bases in Cuba — uh — involve — uh — the security of the Western Hemisphere. This is not just a question of the United States. This is a question of all the Latin American countries, which have all joined together in this effort. Time is running out on us. This must be brought to fruition — uh — The question of the Turkish bases, we think that’s excellent, that you brought that up, and that — uh — that uh — there should be disarmament of the Turkish bases, but that has nothing to do with the security of the Western Hemisphere. It does have to do with the security of Turkey, and we would be happy, and we’re sure the Turks would be, of making a similar arrangement in Turkey. We will withdraw the bases from Turkey if — uh — and allow [word unclear] inspection bases of — uh — of the Soviet Union and permit inspection there.
Unidentified voice: I think it’s too complicated, Bobby.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t think it is.
John Kennedy: Wait, just, it seems to me the first thing we ought to try to do is not let the Turks issue some statement that’s wholly unacceptable. . . . We ought to try to get them not to respond to this till we’ve had a chance to consider what action we’ll take. Now how long will it take to get in touch with the Turks?
Source: Presidential Recordings, Transcripts, President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
Evaluating the Evidence