SPEECH OF HON. S. A. DOUGLAS, OF ILLINOIS

In the Senate, January 30, 1854

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to the consideration of the bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, when I proposed, on Tuesday last, that the Senate should proceed to the consideration of the bill to organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, it was my purpose only to occupy ten or fifteen minutes in explanation of its provisions. I desired to refer to two points; first to those provisions relating to the Indians, and second to those which might be supposed to bear upon the question of slavery. . . .

Upon the other point, that pertaining to the question of slavery in the territories, it was the intention of the committee to be equally explicit. We took the principles established by the compromise acts of 1850 as our guide, and intended to make each and every provision of the bill accord with those principles. Those measures established and rest upon the great principles of self-government, that the people should be allowed to decide the questions of their domestic institutions for themselves, subject only to such limitations and restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution of the United States, instead of having them determined by an arbitrary or geographical line . . . the Missouri compromise, having been superseded by the legislation of 1850, has become and ought to be declared inoperative; and hence we propose to leave the question to the people of the States and the territories, subject only to the limitations and provisions of the Constitution . . . the assumption [of opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was] that the policy of the fathers of the republic was to prohibit slavery in all the territory ceded by the old States to the Union, and made United States territory, for the purpose of being organized into new States. I take issue upon that statement. Such was not the practice in the early history of the government. It is true that in the territory northwest of the Ohio river slavery was prohibited by the ordinance of 1787; but it is also true that in the territory south of the Ohio river, slavery was permitted and protected. . . .

[In the Missouri Compromise] it was provided that slavery should be prohibited, north of 36° 30’ north latitude, in all that country which we had acquired from France. What was the object of the enactment of that . . . section? Was it not to go back to the original policy of prescribing boundaries to the limitation of free institutions, and of slave institutions, by a geographical line, in order to avoid all controversy in Congress upon the subject? . . .

The leading feature of the compromise of 1850 was congressional non-intervention as to slavery in the Territories; that the people of the Territories, and of all the States, were to be allowed to do as they pleased upon the subject of slavery, subject only to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

That, sir, was the leading feature of the compromise measures of 1850. Those measures, therefore, abandoned the idea of a geographical line as the boundary between free States and slave States; abandoned it because compelled to do it from an inability to maintain it; and in lieu of that, substituted a great principle of self-government, which would allow the people to do as they thought proper. . . . We all know that the object of the compromise measures of 1850 was to establish certain great principles which would avoid the slavery agitation in all time to come. . . . Mr. President, I repeat that, so far as the question of slavery is concerned, there is nothing in the bill under consideration which does not carry out the principle of the compromise measures of 1850, by leaving the people to do as they please, subject only to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. If that principle is wrong, the bill is wrong. If that principle is right, the bill is right. . . .

When these States were colonies of Great Britain, every one of them was a slaveholding province. When the Constitution of the United States was formed, twelve out of the thirteen were slave-holding States. Since that time six of those States have become free. How has this been effected? Was it by virtue of abolition agitation in Congress? Was it in obedience to the dictates of the federal government? Not at all; but they have become free States under the silent but sure and irresistible working of that great principle of self-government which teaches every people to do that which the interests of themselves and their posterity morally and pecuniarily may require. . . .

When you propose to give them a Territorial Government, do you not acknowledge that they ought to be erected into a political organization; and when you give them a legislature, do you not acknowledge that they are capable of self-government? Having made that acknowledgement, why should you not allow them to exercise the rights of legislation? Oh, these abolitionists say they are entirely willing to concede all this, with one exception. They say they are willing to trust the Territorial legislature, under the limitations of the Constitution, to legislate upon the rights of inheritance, to legislate in regard to religion, education, and morals, to legislate in regard to the relations of husband and wife, of parent and child, of guardian and ward, upon everything pertaining to the dearest rights and interests of white men, but they are not willing to trust them to legislate in regard to a few miserable negroes. That is their single exception. They acknowledge that the people of the territories are capable of deciding for themselves concerning white men, but not in relation to negroes. The real gist of the matter is this: Does it require any higher degree of civilization, and intelligence, and learning, and sagacity, to legislate for negroes than for white men? If it does, we ought to adopt the abolition doctrine, and go with them against this bill. If it does not—if we are willing to trust the people with the great, sacred, fundamental right of prescribing their own institutions, consistent with the Constitution of the country—we must vote for this bill. . . .

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, SPEECH IN THE SENATE, MARCH 3, 1854

Mr. DOUGLAS. . . .

I will now proceed to the consideration of the great principle involved in the bill, without omitting, however, to notice some of those extraneous matters which have been brought into this discussion with the view of producing another anti-slavery agitation. We have been told by nearly every Senator who has spoken in opposition to this bill, that at the time of its introduction the people were in a state of profound quiet and repose—that the anti-slavery agitation had entirely ceased—and that the whole country was acquiescing cheerfully and cordially in the compromise measures of 1850 as a final adjustment of this vexed question. . . . They say that I, and not they, . . . have revived the agitation. What have I done to render me obnoxious to this charge? They say I wrote and introduced this Nebraska bill. . . . We [the Senate Committee on Territories, which Douglas chaired] were aware that from 1820 to 1850 the abolition doctrine of congressional interference with slavery in the Territories and new States had so far prevailed as to keep up an incessant slavery agitation in Congress, and throughout the country, whenever any new Territory was to be acquired or organized. We were also aware that, in 1850, the right of the people to decide this question for themselves, subject only to the Constitution, was submitted for the doctrine of congressional intervention. This first question, therefore, which the committee were called upon to decide, and indeed the only question of any material importance in framing this bill was this: shall we adhere to and carry out the principle recognized by the compromise measures of 1850, or shall we go back to the old exploded doctrine of congressional interference, as established in 1820. . . . There were no other alternatives. We were compelled to frame the bill upon the one or the other of these two principles. The doctrine of 1820, or the doctrine of 1850, must prevail. . . . The two great political parties of the country stood solemnly pledged before the world to adhere to the compromise measures of 1850, “in principle and substance.” . . . The report of the committee was in accordance with this obligation. . . . The principle which we propose to carry into effect by the bill is this: That Congress shall neither legislate slavery into any Territories or State, nor out of the same; but the people should be left free to regulate their domestic concerns in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. . . .

Well, sir, what is this Missouri compromise, of which we have heard so much of late? It has been read so often that it is not necessary to occupy the time of the Senate in reading it again. It was an act of Congress, passed on the 6^th of March, 1820, to authorize the people of Missouri to form a constitution and a State government, preparatory to the admission of such State into the Union. . . . The last and eighth section provided that slavery should be “forever prohibited” in all the territory which had been acquired from France north of 36°30’, and not included within the limits of the State of Missouri. There is nothing in the terms of the law that purports to be a compact, or indicates that it was anything more than an ordinary act of legislation. . . . But gentlemen aver that it was a solemn compact, which could not be violated or abrogated without dishonor. According to their understanding, the contract was that, in consideration of the admission of Missouri into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever, slavery should be prohibited forever in the Territories north of 36°30′. Now, who were the parties to this alleged compact? They tell us that it was a stipulation between the North and the South. Sir, I know of no such parties under the Constitution. I am unwilling that there shall be any such parties known in our legislation. If there is such a geographical line, it ought to be obliterated forever, and there should be no other parties than those provided for in the Constitution, viz: the States of this Union. These are the only parties capable of contracting under the Constitution of the United States. . . .

Mr. President, I have not brought this question forward as a northern man or as a southern man. I am unwilling to recognize such divisions and distinctions. I have brought it forward as an American Senator, representing a State which is true to this principle, and which has approved of my action in respect to the Nebraska bill. I have brought it forward not as an act of justice to the South more than to the North. I have presented it especially as an act of justice to the people of those Territories, and of the States to be formed therefrom, now and in all time to come. I have nothing to say about northern rights or southern rights. I know of no such divisions or distinctions under the Constitution. The bill does equal and exact justice to the whole Union, and every part of it; it violates the rights of no State or Territory; but places each on a perfect equality, and leaves the people thereof to the free enjoyment of all their rights under the Constitution. . . .