Skills Check

Skills Check

529

Question 12.1

1. If Candidates , , and receive 55, 47, and 10 votes, respectively, what percentage of the votes does each candidate receive? If the Democratic Delegate Selection Rules are used to award delegates, will one of the candidates lose his or her support? Which one and why?

1.

Candidates , , and receive 49.11%, 41.96%, and 8.93% of the vote, respectively. Under the Democratic Delegate Selection Rules, Candidate would lose her support because she received less than 15% of the popular vote.

Question 12.2

2. In Skills Check 1, Candidate is dropped from the election. Calculate the adjusted percentages of the popular vote for Candidates and .

2.

Candidates and receive 53.92% and 46.08% of the popular vote after 's votes are dropped from the total.

Question 12.3

3. If Candidate receives 14,056 of the 23,903 votes and the district has 12 delegates to award, then what is Candidate ’s quota?

3.

Candidate 's quota is .

Question 12.4

4. Candidates , , , and have quotas of 5.32, 3.92, 3.36, and 1.4, respectively. Use Hamilton’s method to award the 14 delegates.

4.

Candidates , , , and receive 5, 4, 3, and 2 delegates, respectively.

Question 12.5

5. If the number of delegates to be awarded for the election in Skills Check 1 is 20, then how many delegates will each candidate receive? (Use Hamilton’s method, but do not use the Democratic Delegate Selection Rules.)

5.

Candidates , , and receive 10, 8, and 2 delegates, respectively.

Question 12.6

6. If the number of delegates to be awarded for the election in Skills Check 1 is 20, then how many delegates will each candidate receive? (Use the Democratic Delegate Selection Rules.)

6.

Because Candidate receives less than 15% of the vote, Candidate receives no delegates. Candidates and receive 11 and 9 delegates, respectively.

Question 12.7

7. If five voters have ideal points 4, 5, 5, 6, and 9, then what is the median of the distribution of their ideal points?

7.

The median is 5.

Question 12.8

8. If six voters have ideal points 4, 5, 5, 6, 9, and 10, then what is the extended median of the distribution of their ideal points?

8.

The extended median is the interval [5, 6].

Question 12.9

9. Give an example of an even number of ideal points where the extended median is a single value, as opposed to an interval.

9.

Answers will vary. One such answer is 1, 2, 2, 3.

Question 12.10

10. For a discrete distribution of voters’ ideal points and an odd number of voters, can there be more than one equilibrium position? Explain.

10.

No. The median has to be a single value.

Question 12.11

11. Explain why, for a discrete distribution of voters’ ideal points and an even number of voters, there can be more than one equilibrium. Must there be more than one equilibrium? Explain.

11.

If the extended median is a single value, then there is a single equilibrium. If the extended median is not a single value, then there is more than one equilibrium.

If the extended median is a single value, then there is a single equilibrium. If the extended median is not a single value, then there is more than one equilibrium.

Question 12.12

12. In a two-candidate election, suppose the attitudes of the voters are distributed symmetrically around the median . Of the two candidates, and , is positioned far to the left of , and is positioned just to the right of . Which, if either, candidate will receive more votes?

  1. will receive a majority of the votes.
  2. will receive a majority of the votes.
  3. and will both receive exactly one-half of the votes.

12.

b

Question 12.13

13. In a two-candidate election, suppose that the attitudes of the voters are skewed to the left of the median , so they are more spread out to the left than to the right. Assume that Candidates and take positions to the left and right of , respectively, so that there are the same numbers of voters between their positions and . Candidate __________ will receive a majority.

13.

Question 12.14

14. In a two-candidate election, which of the following positions is an equilibrium position for both Candidates and ?

  1. and just to the left and right of
  2. and far to the left and right of
  3. and both at

14.

c

Question 12.15

15. Assume that and take distinct equidistant positions from the median of a symmetric distribution (not necessarily unimodal), with half the voters between the announced policy positions of and . Which of the following statements is true?

  1. The 1/3-separation obstacle applies.
  2. The 2/3-separation opportunity applies.
  3. Neither the 1/3-separation obstacle nor the 2/3-separation opportunity applies.
  4. Both the 1/3-separation obstacle and the 2/3-separation opportunity apply.

15.

c

Question 12.16

16. In a three-candidate election, suppose the attitudes of the voters are distributed symmetrically around the median . Of the three candidates, , , and , is positioned far to the left of , is positioned just to the right of , and is positioned at . Candidate ____________ will receive the most votes.

16.

Question 12.17

17. Suppose that Candidate is situated so that exactly 1/3 of the voters lie to his left. In a two-candidate race, if Candidate must remain fixed, Candidate —to maximize her vote total—should situate herself

  1. just to the right of .
  2. at the median .
  3. to the right of so that 1/3 of the voters lie to her right.

17.

a

Question 12.18

18. In a three-candidate election, if Candidates and are positioned at , the election-winning position of Candidate is ________________.

18.

just to the left or just to the right of

530

Question 12.19

19. In a three-candidate election, if Candidates and are positioned just to the left and just to the right of , are there election-winning positions for Candidate ? What are they?

  1. At
  2. Far to the left or right of
  3. There is no election-winning position for Candidate .

19.

c

Question 12.20

20. In a four-candidate election, if candidates are aligned in order , Candidate __________ benefits if drops out of the race.

20.

a

Question 12.21

21. In a five-candidate election, if candidates are aligned in order and each receives about 20% of the vote, Candidate ________ benefits most if Candidates , , and drop out.

21.

Question 12.22

22. Suppose that the distribution of voters’ ideal points is symmetric and that two candidates have announced positions on opposite sides of and equidistant to the median such that there is no 2/3-separation opportunity. Would a third candidate that enters with a policy position farther from the median be a spoiler?

22.

Yes; ultimately decides which candidate wins.

Question 12.23

23. What is the median of 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6? How does this compare with the weighted median of 3, 4, 5, and 6 with associated weights of 2, 3, 1, and 5?

23.

The median is 5. It is the same.

Question 12.24

24. True or False: The median-voter theorem is the special case of the weighted median-voter theorem in which all weights are 1.

24.

True

Question 12.25

25. If states , , and have median positions on a left-right spectrum of 25, 32, and 28, respectively, and the states have 3, 5, and 3 electoral votes, respectively, then what is the weighted median?

25.

28

Question 12.26

26. How does the proposed use of awarding electoral votes based on votes in electoral districts compare with how delegates are awarded in primaries?

26.

Awarding electoral votes based on votes in electoral districts would be the same process as awarding a primary by using a winner-take-all rule.

Question 12.27

27. The National Popular Vote law is a

  1. constitutional amendment.
  2. federal law.
  3. state law.

27.

c

Question 12.28

28. If states with a majority of electoral votes passed the National Popular Vote law, it would be impossible for a candidate for president to win the popular vote and yet lose the Electoral College because ___________.

28.

the electoral votes of the states that passed the National Popular Vote law would award their electoral votes to the candidate with the most votes.