Chapter 5 HEADLINES: The Myth of Asia’s Miracle

A CAUTIONARY FABLE: Once upon a time, Western opinion leaders found themselves both impressed and frightened by the extraordinary growth rates achieved by a set of Eastern economies. Although those economies were still substantially poorer and smaller than those of the West, the speed with which they had transformed themselves from peasant societies into industrial powerhouses, their continuing ability to achieve growth rates several times higher than the advanced nations, and their increasing ability to challenge or even surpass American and European technology in certain areas seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology. The leaders of those nations did not share our faith in free markets or unlimited civil liberties. They asserted with increasing self-confidence that their system was superior: societies that accepted strong, even authoritarian governments and were willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the common good, take charge of their economics, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests for the sake of long-run growth would eventually outperform the increasingly chaotic societies of the West. And a growing minority of Western intellectuals agreed.

The gap between Western and Eastern economic performance eventually be- came a political issue. The Democrats recaptured the White House under the leadership of a young, energetic new president who pledged to “get the country moving again”—a pledge that, to him and his closest advisers, meant accelerating America’s economic growth to meet the Eastern challenge.

The time, of course, was the early 1960s. The dynamic young president was John F. Kennedy. The technological feats that so alarmed the West were the launch of Sputnik and the early Soviet lead in space. And the rapidly growing Eastern economies were those of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.

Were you tricked by this fable? Did you think that the “Eastern economies” that the author, Paul Krugman, referred to in the beginning were the Asian economies? Krugman is using this rhetorical trick to suggest that the high growth of the Asian economies is not too different from the growth of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, which was due to capital accumulation but without much productivity growth. Other economists disagree and believe that Asian growth is due in significant part to improved productivity, in addition to capital accumulation.

Source: Excerpted from Paul Krugman, 1994, “The Myth of Asias Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 63–79. Reprinted by permission of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, November/December. Copyright 1994 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. www.ForeignAffairs.com.

Questions to Consider

After reading The Myth of Asia's Miracle, consider the question(s) below. Then “submit” your response.

Question

blro5DxuWksbTPj0puN24c+k/AaqDp5Ipigm1hYtWqsrnUjN7DQqND9J7mh1Ta4kg7JVtiazOGVEHYbTIobr3fJknPVM+hDgE+/Qjfplu4KAaFzYtb7rI5AcekbGM4Fcfuq3w16e0efT9M8sr3+JYskjff3ZFJAa35nQYtqM/C5B6op4MX3C1w==
Without productivity growth, economic growth based on capital accumulation can’t be sustained.

Question

UDH1XjwSigy6nEIW79SQNTCq1PhXAx88DrtwqI7MyXhl/ULCf5DjLroRBqAXMpPRa0w3ii3eXn8gri6iQzDCNk/FDOC2igu8lyrC+PR0xtZR9PQF5AAKpxzIa/47njthBrSexWyH1l10UWMW+x1iwujaDovUZ8rLcaXu6QQL568URJbDoRLtO89y2trmI8mNLpAOpw==
Answers will vary. One answer might be no. The parallel is not accurate. Capital accumulation in Asia was primarily meant to produce goods for the export markets and not domestic consumption. Capital growth in the Soviet Union was meant for domestic consumption. The west bought Asia’s goods. Only the Soviet Bloc bought the Soviet Union’s goods. The trouble is not capital accumulation but in matching it with demand.