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Figure 16.2 The Principal–Agent Problem as a Sequential Game
In a game between a mobile phone kiosk owner, Selena, and her employee, Joe, Selena has the first move. If Selena chooses to pay a flat $150, the interests of Joe and Selena do not align. Joe earns more by being lazy ($150 compared to a payoff of $0 if he works hard, because of his cost of effort). Selena prefers that he works hard so that she earns $750 compared to $450 if Joe is lazy. If Selena chooses to link Joe’s pay to the kiosk’s profit, Joe’s and Selena’s interests align. Now, Joe will choose to work hard, earning him $54 and Selena $696. As a result, Selena chooses to link Joe’s pay to the kiosk’s profit.