Julius Caesar’s successful campaigns in Gaul played a key role in his rise to political power. In 59 B.C.E. Caesar was elected consul. At the conclusion of a consul’s one-year term, it was customary for ex-consuls to serve one or more years abroad as a governor of a province, or proconsul. Through careful political maneuvering, Caesar ensured that he would serve as proconsul for five years and that his province would include Cisalpine Gaul, Transalpine Gaul, and Illyricum, territories that offered him ample opportunities for military glory and personal enrichment. In 50 B.C.E., at the very moment when the rivalry between Caesar and Pompey was about to plunge Rome into civil war, Caesar chose to remind the Roman public of his victories in Gaul by writing and publishing The Gallic War. The central purpose of this deeply political document was to present Caesar as the consummate Roman military leader. In this excerpt, Caesar describes his efforts to rally his wavering officers and men as they prepared for an attack by Germanic forces under the leadership of Ariovistus. As you read it, consider what lessons Caesar might have hoped his audience would draw from his account.

After three days’ march Caesar was informed that Ariovistus was making for Vesontio (the main town of the Sequani) with all his forces to seize control of it, and that he was already three days out from his own borders. Caesar knew he must make every effort to prevent this happening, for the town contained an abundance of the resources necessary for warfare. It was also protected by its natural site in such a way as to provide a strong position for conducting a campaign—especially since the River Doubs practically surrounds the entire town, like a circle drawn with compasses. The remaining perimeter, of not more than 1,600 feet, where the river does not flow, is filled in by a high mountain, the roots of which touch the banks of the river on either side. A wall around its base makes it into a citadel and links it with the town. Caesar made for this place, marching day and night; he seized the town and posted a garrison in it.

He remained in Vesontio for a few days to gather corn and supplies, during which time such a terrible panic suddenly seized our whole army as severely affected everyone’s courage and morale. Our men started asking questions, and the Gauls and traders replied by describing how tall and strong the Germans were, how unbelievably brave and skilful with weapons. Often, they claimed, when they had met the Germans in battle they had been unable to stand even the way they looked, the sternness of their gaze. The panic began among the military tribunes and prefects, and the other men who, having no great military experience, had followed Caesar from Rome to court his friendship. Some of them started offering various excuses for urgent departure, and asked his permission to go; others stayed behind out of shame, wanting to avoid the taint of cowardice. These men could not conceal their fearful expressions, nor, at times, could they restrain their tears. They hid themselves away in their tents and bemoaned their fate, or among their friends lamented the common danger. Throughout the camp all the men were signing and sealing their wills.

Thanks to their fearful complaining, gradually even men of great military experience began to be affected—the legionary soldiers, centurions, and cavalry officers. Some were eager to appear less cowardly, and declared that it was not the enemy they feared, but the restricted, narrow route of the march, the depths of forest between themselves and Ariovistus, or the arrangement of satisfactory transport for the corn supply. Some even went so far as to tell Caesar that, although he had given the order to strike camp and move out, the soldiers would not obey him and, because of their fear, would refuse to lift the standards.

As soon as Caesar was aware of the situation he called a council, ordered centurions of all ranks to attend, and severely reprimanded them, primarily for thinking that it was their business to inquire or think about either the direction or the strategy of the march. During his consulship, Caesar went on, Ariovistus had eagerly sought friendly relations with the Roman people. Why would anyone now conclude that he was going to abandon his obligations rashly? In fact, he was convinced that once Ariovistus understood the terms he was offering, and considered the fairness of the conditions, he would not spurn the favour either of Caesar or of the Roman people.

And even if Ariovistus did start a war, Caesar continued, spurred on by some mad fury, what was there to fear even then? Why did they despair of their own courage, or of his anxious concern for their well-being? The danger posed by this enemy had already been experienced in the time of our fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutoni were expelled by Gaius Marius. On that occasion it was clear that the army had deserved as much credit as its commander. The same danger had also been experienced more recently during the slave revolt in Italy. In this instance the slaves were helped to some degree by the experience and training which they had received from us.

From all this, said Caesar, they could see how crucial was firmness of purpose. After all, for a time they had feared the slaves, who were then without weapons: yet later they had defeated those same slaves after they were armed and had won battles. Finally, the Germans were the same people who had often clashed with the Helvetii—and the Helvetii had frequently beaten them, not only within their own borders but also in Germany itself—and yet the Helvetii had proved no match for our army.

Perhaps, he went on, some of those present were disturbed by the defeat and flight of the Gauls. But if they took the trouble to inquire they would discover that the Gauls had been worn down by the long duration of the campaign, before Ariovistus (who had for many months been skulking in his camp in the marshes, giving them no chance to attack him) suddenly launched his assault upon them, when the Gauls had given up hope of battle and had already dispersed. He had won, then, more by tactical planning than by conspicuous bravery. And even if there was a place for these tactics when faced with barbarians of no military skill, not even Ariovistus would pin his hopes on the success of such tactics as a means of beating our army.

As for those who shifted the blame for their own fear on to a pretended anxiety about corn supplies or the narrowness of the route, they were doing so out of presumption. After all, they apparently either doubted their commander’s commitment or they were dictating it to Caesar. Yet his attention was taken up with all these things: the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were supplying corn, and the crop was already ripe in the fields—as for the route of their march, in a short while they would themselves decide it. On the subject of their declared intention not to follow orders and raise the standards, it did not trouble him at all. He was well aware that whenever an army had disobeyed its commander in the past, it was either because fortune had deserted him, as proven by his failure on the field, or because he had been discovered in some crime and found guilty of rapacity. That he, Caesar, was himself guilty of no crime was evident from the whole course of his life: that he was a man who enjoyed good fortune was evident from his campaign against the Helvetii.

And so, Caesar concluded, he would do at once what he had intended to put off till a later date. The very next night, during the fourth watch, they would strike camp. Then he would know as soon as possible whether their sense of shame and duty was stronger than their fear. Moreover, even if no one at all followed him, then he would still set out, with only the Tenth legion, for he had no doubts about its loyalty. Indeed, it would in future serve as his bodyguard. (Caesar had treated this legion with special favour, and had the fullest confidence in its courage.)

At the end of this speech the change of attitude was quite remarkable, and there arose an immense enthusiasm and eagerness to start the campaign. The Tenth legion was first to express its thanks to Caesar, through the military tribunes, for the excellent opinion he had formed of it, and it declared its readiness to start the campaign. Then the other legions urged their military tribunes and senior centurions to make amends to Caesar. They claimed they had never been in doubt nor afraid, nor did they think the supreme command belonged to them instead of their commander. Their apology was accepted.

Source: Julius Caesar, Seven Commentaries on The Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 24–27.

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