Khrushchev also de-Stalinized Soviet foreign policy. “Peaceful coexistence” with capitalism was possible, he argued, and war was not inevitable. Khrushchev negotiated with Western diplomats, agreeing in 1955, for example, to independence for a neutral Austria. As a result, Cold War tensions relaxed considerably between 1955 and 1957. At the same time, Khrushchev began wooing the new nations of Asia and Africa — even those that were not Communist — with promises of support and economic aid.

In the East Bloc states, Communist leaders responded in complex ways to de-Stalinization. In East Germany, the regime stubbornly resisted reform, but in Poland and Hungary, de-Stalinization stimulated rebelliousness. Poland took the lead in 1956, when extensive popular demonstrations brought a new government to power. By promising to remain loyal to the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Communists managed to win greater autonomy from Soviet control.

Hungary experienced an ultimately tragic revolution the same year. Led by students and workers, the people of Budapest installed Imre Nagy (IM-rey nadge), a liberal Communist reformer, as the new prime minister in October 1956. Though never renouncing communism, Nagy demanded open, multiparty elections, the relaxation of political repression, and other reforms.

At first, it seemed that the Soviets might negotiate, but the breathing space was short-lived. When Nagy announced that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact and asked the United Nations to protect the country’s neutrality, the Soviets grew alarmed. On November 4, Soviet troops moved in on the capital city of Budapest and crushed the revolution. Fighting was bitter until the end, for the Hungarians hoped that the United Nations would come to their aid. This did not occur — in part because the Western powers were involved in the Suez crisis (see page 903) and were, in general, reluctant to confront the Soviets directly in Europe with military force. When a new, more conservative Communist regime executed Nagy and other protest leaders, many people in the East Bloc concluded that their best hope was to strive for internal reform without openly challenging Soviet control.

The outcome of the Hungarian uprising weakened support for Soviet-style communism in western Europe. At the same time, Western politicians saw that the U.S.S.R. would use military force to defend its control of the East Bloc and that only open war between East and West had the potential to overturn Communist rule there. This price was too high, and it seemed that Communist domination of the satellite states was there to stay.