26-2 How do misinformation, imagination, and source amnesia influence our memory construction? How do we decide whether a memory is real or false?

Memory is not precise. Like scientists who infer a dinosaur’s appearance from its remains, we infer our past from stored information plus what we later imagined, expected, saw, and heard. We don’t just retrieve memories, we reweave them. Like Wikipedia pages, memories can be continuously revised. When we “replay” a memory, we often replace the original with a slightly modified version (Hardt et al., 2010). (Memory researchers call this reconsolidation.) So, in a sense, said Joseph LeDoux (2009), “your memory is only as good as your last memory. The fewer times you use it, the more pristine it is.” This means that, to some degree, “all memory is false” (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009).

Despite knowing all this, I [DM] recently rewrote my own past. It happened at an international conference, where memory researcher Elizabeth Loftus (2012) was demonstrating how memory works. Loftus showed us a handful of individual faces that we were later to identify, as if in a police lineup. Later, she showed us some pairs of faces, one face we had seen earlier and one we had not, and asked us to identify the one we had seen. But one pair she had slipped in included two new faces, one of which was rather like a face we had seen earlier. Most of us understandably but wrongly identified this face as one we had previously seen. To climax the demonstration, when she showed us the originally seen face and the previously chosen wrong face, most of us picked the wrong face! As a result of our memory reconsolidation, we—an audience of psychologists who should have known better—had replaced the original memory with a false memory.

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Clinical researchers are experimenting with people’s memory reconsolidation. They have people recall a traumatic or negative experience, then disrupt the reconsolidation of that memory with a drug or brief, painless electroconvulsive shock (Kroes et al., 2014; Lonergan, 2013). If, indeed, it becomes possible to erase your memory for a specific traumatic experience—by reactivating your memory and then disrupting its storage—would you wish for this? If brutally assaulted, would you welcome having your memory of the attack and its associated fears deleted?

In more than 200 experiments involving more than 20,000 people, Loftus has shown how eyewitnesses reconstruct their memories after a crime or an accident. In one experiment, two groups of people watched a film clip of a traffic accident and then answered questions about what they had seen (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Those asked, “About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?” gave higher speed estimates than those asked, “About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?” A week later, when asked whether they recalled seeing any broken glass, people who had heard smashed were more than twice as likely to report seeing glass fragments (FIGURE 26.8). In fact, the clip showed no broken glass.

In many follow-up experiments around the world, others have witnessed an event, received or not received misleading information about it, and then taken a memory test. The repeated result is a misinformation effect: Exposed to misleading information, we often, though feeling confident, misremember. A yield sign becomes a stop sign, hammers become screwdrivers, Coke cans become peanut cans, breakfast cereal becomes eggs, and a clean-shaven man morphs into a man with a mustache (Loftus et al., 1992).

So powerful is the misinformation effect that it can influence later attitudes and behaviors (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). One experiment falsely suggested to some Dutch university students that, as children, they became ill after eating spoiled egg salad (Geraerts et al., 2008). After absorbing that suggestion, they were less likely to eat egg salad sandwiches, both immediately and four months later.

Because the misinformation effect happens outside our awareness, it is nearly impossible to sift the suggested ideas out of the larger pool of real memories (Schooler et al., 1986). Perhaps you can recall describing a childhood experience to a friend and filling in memory gaps with reasonable guesses and assumptions. We all do it, and after more retellings, those guessed details—now absorbed into our memories—may feel as real as if we had actually experienced them (Roediger et al., 1993). False memories, like fake diamonds, seem real.

Even repeatedly imagining nonexistent actions and events can create false memories. American and British university students were asked to imagine certain childhood events, such as breaking a window with their hand or having a skin sample removed from a finger. One in four of them later recalled the imagined event as something that had really happened (Garry et al., 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003).

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Digitally altered photos have also produced this imagination inflation. In experiments, researchers have altered photos from a family album to show some family members taking a hot air balloon ride. After viewing these photos (rather than photos showing just the balloon), children reported more false memories and indicated high confidence in those memories. When interviewed several days later, they reported even richer details of their false memories (Strange et al., 2008; Wade et al., 2002).

Misinformation and imagination effects occur partly because visualizing something and actually perceiving it activate similar brain areas (Gonsalves et al., 2004). Imagined events also later seem more familiar, and familiar things seem more real. The more vividly we can imagine things, the more likely they are to become memories (Loftus, 2001; Porter et al., 2000).

In British and Canadian university surveys, nearly one-fourth of students have reported autobiographical memories that they later realized were not accurate (Mazzoni et al., 2010). I [DM] empathize. For decades, my cherished earliest memory was of my parents getting off the bus and walking to our house, bringing my baby brother home from the hospital. When, in middle age, I shared that memory with my father, he assured me they did not bring their newborn home on the Seattle Transit System. The human mind, it seems, comes with built-in Photoshopping software.

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Among the frailest parts of a memory is its source. We may recognize someone but have no idea where we have seen the person. We may dream an event and later be unsure whether it really happened. We may misrecall how we learned about something (Henkel et al., 2000). Psychologists are not immune to the process. Famed child psychologist Jean Piaget was startled as an adult to learn that a vivid, detailed memory from his childhood—a nursemaid’s thwarting his kidnapping—was utterly false. He apparently constructed the memory from repeatedly hearing the story (which his nursemaid, after undergoing a religious conversion, later confessed had never happened). In attributing his “memory” to his own experiences, rather than to his nursemaid’s stories, Piaget exhibited source amnesia (also called source misattribution). Misattribution is at the heart of many false memories. Authors and songwriters sometimes suffer from it. They think an idea came from their own creative imagination, when in fact they are unintentionally plagiarizing something they earlier read or heard.

Debra Poole and Stephen Lindsay (1995, 2001, 2002) demonstrated source amnesia among preschoolers. They had the children interact with “Mr. Science,” who engaged them in activities such as blowing up a balloon with baking soda and vinegar. Three months later, on three successive days, their parents read them a story describing some things the children had experienced with Mr. Science and some they had not. When a new interviewer asked what Mr. Science had done with them—“Did Mr. Science have a machine with ropes to pull?”—4 in 10 children spontaneously recalled him doing things that had happened only in the story.

Source amnesia also helps explain déjà vu (French for “already seen”). Two-thirds of us have experienced this fleeting, eerie sense that “I’ve been in this exact situation before.” It happens most commonly to well-educated, imaginative young adults, especially when tired or stressed (Brown, 2003, 2004a,b; McAneny, 1996). Some wonder, “How could I recognize a situation I’m experiencing for the first time?” Others may think of reincarnation (“I must have experienced this in a previous life”) or precognition (“I viewed this scene in my mind before experiencing it”).

Alan Brown and Elizabeth Marsh (2009) devised an intriguing way to induce déjà vu in the laboratory. They invited participants to view symbols on a computer screen and to report whether they had ever seen them before. What the viewers didn’t know was that these symbols had earlier been subliminally flashed on the screen, too briefly for conscious awareness. The result? Half the participants reported experiencing déjà vu—a sense of familiarity without awareness of why. Brown and Marsh suggest that real-life experiences may include glancing very briefly at a visual scene, looking away without consciously processing it, then looking again—only to feel the uncanny sense of having seen it before.

The key to déjà vu seems to be familiarity with a stimulus without a clear idea of where we encountered it before (Cleary, 2008). Normally, we experience a feeling of familiarity (thanks to temporal lobe processing) before we consciously remember details (thanks to hippocampus and frontal lobe processing). When these functions (and brain regions) are out of sync, we may experience a feeling of familiarity without conscious recall. Our amazing brains try to make sense of such an improbable situation, and we get an eerie feeling that we’re reliving some earlier part of our life. After all, the situation is familiar, even though we have no idea why. Our source amnesia forces us to do our best to make sense of an odd moment.

Because memory is reconstruction as well as reproduction, we can’t be sure whether a memory is real by how real it feels. Much as perceptual illusions may seem like real perceptions, unreal memories feel like real memories.

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False memories can be persistent. Imagine that we were to read aloud a list of words such as candy, sugar, honey, and taste. Later, we ask you to recognize the presented words from a larger list. If you are at all like the people tested by Henry Roediger and Kathleen McDermott (1995), you would err three out of four times—by falsely remembering a nonpresented similar word, such as sweet. We more easily remember the gist than the words themselves.

Memory construction helps explain why about 75 percent of 301 convicts exonerated by later DNA testing had been misjudged based on faulty eyewitness identification (Lilienfeld & Byron, 2013). It explains why “hypnotically refreshed” memories of crimes so easily incorporate errors, some of which originate with the hypnotist’s leading questions (“Did you hear loud noises?”). It explains why dating partners who fell in love have overestimated their first impressions of one another (“It was love at first sight”), while those who broke up underestimated their earlier liking (“We never really clicked”) (McFarland & Ross, 1987). And it explains why people asked how they felt 10 years ago about marijuana or gender issues recalled attitudes closer to their current views than to the views they had actually reported a decade earlier (Markus, 1986). How people feel today tends to be how they recall they have always felt (Mazzoni & Vannucci, 2007).

One research team interviewed 73 ninth-grade boys and then reinterviewed them 35 years later. When asked to recall how they had reported their attitudes, activities, and experiences, most men recalled their ninth-grade statements at a rate no better than chance. Only 1 in 3 now remembered receiving physical punishment, though as ninth-graders 82 percent had said they had (Offer et al., 2000). As George Vaillant (1977, p. 197) noted after following adult lives through time, “It is all too common for caterpillars to become butterflies and then to maintain that in their youth they had been little butterflies. Maturation makes liars of us all.”

26-3 How reliable are young children’s eyewitness descriptions?

If memories can be sincere, yet sincerely wrong, might children’s recollections of sexual abuse be prone to error? “It would be truly awful to ever lose sight of the enormity of child abuse,” observed Stephen Ceci (1993). Yet Ceci and Maggie Bruck’s (1993, 1995) studies of children’s memories have made them aware of how easily children’s memories can be molded. For example, they asked 3-year-olds to show on anatomically correct dolls where a pediatrician had touched them. Of the children who had not received genital examinations, 55 percent pointed to either genital or anal areas.

In other experiments, the researchers studied the effect of suggestive interviewing techniques (Bruck & Ceci, 1999, 2004). In one study, children chose a card from a deck of possible happenings, and an adult then read the card to them. For example, “Think real hard, and tell me if this ever happened to you. Can you remember going to the hospital with a mousetrap on your finger?” In interviews, the same adult repeatedly asked children to think about several real and fictitious events. After 10 weeks of this, a new adult asked the same question. The stunning result: 58 percent of preschoolers produced false (often vivid) stories regarding one or more events they had never experienced (Ceci et al., 1994). Here’s one:

My brother Colin was trying to get Blowtorch [an action figure] from me, and I wouldn’t let him take it from me, so he pushed me into the wood pile where the mousetrap was. And then my finger got caught in it. And then we went to the hospital, and my mommy, daddy, and Colin drove me there, to the hospital in our van, because it was far away. And the doctor put a bandage on this finger.

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Given such detailed stories, professional psychologists who specialize in interviewing children could not reliably separate the real memories from the false ones. Nor could the children themselves. The above child, reminded that his parents had told him several times that the mousetrap incident never happened—that he had imagined it—protested, “But it really did happen. I remember it!” In another experiment, preschoolers merely overheard an erroneous remark that a magician’s missing rabbit had gotten loose in their classroom. Later, when the children were suggestively questioned, 78 percent of them recalled actually seeing the rabbit (Principe et al., 2006). “[The] research leads me to worry about the possibility of false allegations. It is not a tribute to one’s scientific integrity to walk down the middle of the road if the data are more to one side,” said Ceci (1993). (See Thinking Critically About: Repressed or Constructed Memories of Abuse?)

Children can, however, be accurate eyewitnesses. When questioned about their experiences in neutral words they understood, children often accurately recalled what happened and who did it (Goodman, 2006; Howe, 1997; Pipe, 1996). When interviewers used less suggestive, more effective techniques, even 4-to 5-year-old children produced more accurate recall (Holliday & Albon, 2004; Pipe et al., 2004). Children were especially accurate when they had not talked with involved adults prior to the interview and when their disclosure was made in a first interview with a neutral person who asked nonleading questions.

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