[I]n the course of a lifetime, human beings learn a multitude of problem solutions that were discovered by those who came before them. They do not have to invent spoken language or the alphabet; they do not have to discover fire or the wheel or even how to eat baby food with a spoon. Other people show them. (Gleitman, 1981, p. 498)

From driving a car and hitting a tennis ball to eating sushi or doing the tango, we learn largely from watching others model those behaviors. In fact, we saw in chapter 4 that certain neurons, called mirror neurons, are activated both when one does an action oneself and when one simply observes another person perform that action (Uddin et al., 2007). As the neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni notes, “When you see me perform an action—such as picking up a baseball—you automatically simulate the action in your own brain” (Blakeslee, 2006). Albert Bandura (1965) developed social learning theory and an associated research program to better understand factors that affect how people are influenced by observing others.

In Bandura’s seminal studies (Bandura et al., 1961, 1963a, 1963b), mildly frustrated nursery school children (between ages three and six) watched a film of a young woman punch and kick a large inflated Bobo doll and hit it with a mallet. Children readily imitated this behavior when they were later given an opportunity to play with the Bobo doll, punching and kicking the doll and hitting it with the mallet in a manner that was eerily similar to the model’s behavior, right down to repeating the same aggressive remarks that the model had made (e.g., “Pow, right in the nose, boom, boom.”). Similar results occurred whether the film showed a live-action model or a cartoon figure hitting a cartoon depiction of the doll. But observing and learning a behavior doesn’t necessarily mean we will imitate it. According to social learning theory, we can either be encouraged to engage or discouraged from engaging in both new and known behaviors on the basis of whether the consequences of the actions for the model are positive or negative. Thus, children were more likely to imitate the Bobo-doll-bashing model if the model was rewarded for the actions (e.g., supplied with a 7 Up and candy), and were less likely if the model was punished for the actions (e.g., a second adult spanked the aggressive model with a rolled-up magazine) (Bandura, 1965). Learning is also influenced by our sensitivity to social cues and motivations. For example, imitation was also more likely when the model seemed likeable and similar to the children. Finally, social learning is more likely if the behavior observed is consistent with the motivational state of the observer. So frustrated kids are more likely to imitate a violent model. But rewarded models tend to be imitated regardless of the motivational state of the observer.

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Does the tendency to imitation also occur in adults? The next time you find yourself at a restaurant, take a look at the people at other tables. How often do you see people mirroring each other’s posture—two people both leaning in on their elbows, or a group that all have their arms folded across their chests? Tanya Chartrand and John Bargh (1999) documented this phenomenon, which they called the chameleon effect—the tendency to mimic unconsciously the nonverbal mannerisms of someone with whom you are interacting.

To document the chameleon effect, the researchers paired each participant with a partner and had them take turns telling a story about a photograph. The participants performed this task twice, with two different partners. Unknown to the participants, these partners actually were confederates of the experimenters and had been trained ahead of time either to rub their faces or shake one of their feet at certain times during the interaction. They had also been trained to smile or remain neutral during the interaction. The interactions were videotaped and later coded by judges, according to how often the participants rubbed their faces or shook a foot. As expected, when doing the task with a face-rubbing confederate, participants were more likely to rub their faces; when doing the task with a foot-shaking confederate, participants were more likely to shake a foot. They were also more likely to smile when the confederate they were paired with was smiling. None of the participants reported having any conscious awareness of the other person’s mannerisms or the fact that they might have mimicked them.

Additional research shows that this kind of mimicry isn’t limited to casual, nonverbal behaviors. People also automatically shift their attitudes toward what they think another person’s opinions might be, especially when they are motivated to get along with that person. To show this, one study (Sinclair et al., 2005) had White participants complete an implicit association test (the IAT, which we introduced back in chapter 3) to measure their automatically activated attitudes toward African Americans in the presence of an experimenter who was wearing a T-shirt that either was blank or said “Eracism” (a play on words that suggests the eradication of racism). The researchers also had the experimenter act in either a friendly or rude way.

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The researchers predicted that people would shift their attitudes toward the attitude of the experimenter, but only if they liked her. Compared with the blank T-shirt, the Eracism shirt communicated that the experimenter might have more positive attitudes toward minorities. So when the experimenter wore the latter shirt and was likeable, participants indeed exhibited more positive implicit attitudes toward African Americans in their IAT responses. But this study also demonstrated that participants did not shift their attitudes when they did not like the antiracism experimenter. Similarly, the chameleon effect occurs mainly when the other person is likeable (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).

The role of liking suggests that mimicry often may happen because most social interactions involve a general goal of trying to get along. Unless they are truly disagreeable, most people go into an interaction with a stranger with the goal of being liked. Our group-living ancestors were probably more successful at propagating their genes into the future by being able to interact with each other smoothly and thereby coordinate behavior to achieve shared goals. Given our general sociability as a species, then, we shouldn’t be surprised that people have an unconscious tendency to mimic others’ mannerisms and attitudes.

Robert Cialdini’s (2003) focus theory of normative conduct emphasizes the important role that salience plays in enhancing the influence of norms. This theory distinguishes between two different types of norms. Injunctive norms are beliefs about which behaviors are generally approved of or disapproved of in one’s culture. Descriptive norms are beliefs about what most people typically do. Often the two norms align. For instance, people generally think that motorists should stop at red lights and that most of them do. However, norms can also diverge. People also think that others should not litter but believe that most people do. In studies directed toward decreasing littering and increasing energy conservation and recycling, Cialdini and colleagues have found that reminding people of either type of norm regarding these behaviors, whether through exposure to another person’s behavior or to a posted sign, tends to increase adherence to the norms.

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