Draw Conclusions from the Evidence for Thinking through Sources 24
Instructions
This exercise asks you to assess the relationship between conclusions and evidence. Identify which of the following conclusions are supported by the specific piece of evidence. Click “yes” for those pieces of evidence that support the conclusion and “no” for those that do not.
Conclusion A
Harry Truman adopted a containment policy in response to the Soviet Union’s actions in Europe, but Communist leader Mao Zedong’s victory in China in 1949 led the Truman administration to escalate its efforts to contain communism in Asia.
Evidence 1: “Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia are. . . in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter [to develop] sufficient military power in selected non-Communist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism.”—Document 24.1: Sidney W. Souers, NSC 48
A. |
B. |
Evidence 2: “Further Kim said that he himself cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law. Then he stated that if it is not possible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he will try to meet with Mao Zedong, after his return from Moscow. Kim underscored that Mao Zedong promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China.”—Document 24.2: Terenti Shtykov, Telegram
A. |
B. |
Evidence 3: “I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East. In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors.”—Document 24.3: Harry Truman, Radio Address on Korea
A. |
B. |
Evidence 4: “The world has turned over many times since I took the oath at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have all since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barracks ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that old soldiers never die; they just fade away. And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.”—Document 24.4: Douglas MacArthur, Speech before Congress
A. |
B. |
Conclusion B
Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 led the Truman administration to conclude that Communists were on the move in Asia, to move beyond political containment, and to use military means to protect Syngman Rhee’s democratic republic.
Evidence 1: “In pursuit of these objectives, the United States should act to:• Support non-Communist forces in taking the initiative in Asia;• Exert an influence to advance its own national interests; and• Initiate action in such a manner as will appeal to the Asiatic nations as being compatible with their national interests and worthy of their support.”—Document 24.1: Sidney W. Souers, NSC 48
A. |
B. |
Evidence 2: “In the process of this conversation Kim Il Sung repeatedly underscored his wish to get the advice of Comrade Stalin on the question of the situation in the south of Korea, since [Kim Il Sung] is constantly nurturing his idea about an attack.”—Document 24.2: Terenti Shtykov, Telegram
A. |
B. |
Evidence 3: “I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East. In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors.”—Document 24.3: Harry Truman, Radio Address on Korea
A. |
B. |
Evidence 4: “The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action was confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy’s sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.”—Document 24.4: Douglas MacArthur, Speech before Congress
A. |
B. |
Conclusion C
As the first American military engagement of the Cold War era, the Korean War exposed American leaders’ disagreements about what strategies they should use to contain communism and how far they should go to reduce its influence in the world.
Evidence 1: “Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia are:. . .• Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.• Prevention of power relationships in Asia which would enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.”—Document 24.1: Sidney W. Souers, NSC 48
A. |
B. |
Evidence 2: “What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong—tragically wrong—for us to take the initiative in extending the war. . . .A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.”—Document 24.3: Harry Truman, Radio Address on Korea
A. |
B. |
Evidence 3: “There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history’s clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier wars. . . .The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action was confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy’s sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.”—Document 24.4: Douglas MacArthur, Speech before Congress
A. |
B. |
Evidence 4: “We’ve Been Using More of a Roundish One,” Washington Post
A. |
B. |
Thinking through Sources forExploring American Histories, Volume 2Printed Page 189